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UPDATE ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2014 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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UPDATE ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2014 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 25, 2015.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mrs. HARTZLER. Welcome. I am delighted to convene this meeting.

Nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of national security for the United States and our allies. It is also fundamental to preserving international stability. Our nuclear deterrent not only keeps potential adversaries at bay, it also assures and comforts our allies. This central, but often not immediately visible role has prevented both nuclear war and large-scale conventional war between the world's great powers for 70 years.

Seven months ago, in an open letter to the men and women who serve with U.S. nuclear forces, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel declared that "our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring U.S. national security." He also said, "no other capability we have is more important." I agree.

I am honored to represent the officers and enlisted personnel assigned to Whiteman Air Force Base. Among these are the very talented and capable members of the 509th Bomb Wing and 131st Bomb Wing who fly and maintain the B–2 Spirit bomber. Theirs is a demanding and challenging job, carried out away from the limelight but with dedication and perseverance.

These Air Force personnel form a critical part of the U.S. nuclear triad that carries out this priority mission. Yet, we are at a critical inflection point for our nuclear forces.

As the age of U.S. nuclear weapons increases and some of our bombers, submarines, and intercontinental missiles become older than the personnel who maintain and operate them, potential adversaries are fielding newer and more advanced nuclear arms. Many prospective foes are also making nuclear weapons more, not less, central to their national strategies.

Chairman Thornberry has turned his committee's attention to these vitally important topics this week. The committee is con-

vening a series of open hearings and classified briefings to learn more details of the challenges facing our nuclear enterprise. Today's oversight hearing is part of that broader effort.

Not long ago, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel called on both internal and external teams of specialists to consider the various deep-seated problems confronting our nuclear enterprise. The report of the Nuclear Enterprise Review was sobering.

It set forth many important recommendations to fix serious shortcomings which inhibited work of those at Whiteman Air Force Base and its Air Force and Navy counterparts in the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] fields and across the submarine force.

This afternoon, we will hear from the Defense Department's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE] office. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, who we heard from at a hearing earlier today, charged this office with the responsibility for assessing and measuring implementation of the recommendations contained in the Nuclear Enterprise Review.

We will also hear testimony from the senior commanders responsible for the Air Force bomber and missile units and for the Navy's sea-based nuclear weapons carried by submarines. The subcommittee seeks to know what has been accomplished. We also seek to know which recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review remain problematic. We must solve the challenges confronting our nuclear enterprise in a long-term and sustainable fashion.

So before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for her introduction.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to all of the witnesses here today.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that we spend approximately $350 billion over the next decade to sustain and modernize our nuclear arsenal. Over the next 30 years, this bill could add up to $1 trillion.

A letter sent to this committee last year by STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] Commander Admiral Haney suggested nuclear weapons could consume close to 10 percent of the defense budget for a period of time, though he has since walked back from that statement before this committee.

Under Secretary Frank Kendall stated earlier this year and I quote: "We do have a huge affordability problem with nuclear modernization," end quote. But even as we spend vast sums to modernize, there has been extreme troubling lapses in the leadership underpinning our system of nuclear weapons.

At the highest levels of leadership, the former deputy commander of STRATCOM was removed after revelations that he was spending 30 hours a week gambling at an Iowa casino using fake poker chips.

A two-star general in charge of all U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles was drunk and offensive while he partied with Russian women during an official trip to Moscow.

In 2013, 76 enlisted sailors were involved in cheating at a naval reactor training facility. Similarly, in the officer ranks of the ICBM force, over 90 missileers were implicated in cheating on tests and several were prosecuted on narcotics charges. Furthermore, one missileer was charged with having been a gang leader.

A 2013 RAND study warned that morale was low judging from these recent incidents. I can see why. In 2007, six nuclear weapons were loaded on a B–52 bomber and flown across the country before anyone realized the mistake. We are beyond lucky that nothing has happened. And as all of you know, we cannot rely on luck when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.

Surprisingly, this is the first hearing that our committee has held to examine these more recent problems and what is being done to address them. I am encouraged that Secretary Hagel and now Secretary Carter are taking these issues seriously and have put in place a system to remedy these issues.

I look forward to hearing from CAPE about progress on implementing the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews and hearing from the Navy and the Air Force on what challenges remain and what improvements are still needed.

These problems must be detected early. And more importantly, we must restore a culture of effective leadership and integrity throughout our nuclear forces.

I am concerned that several of these problems such as the cheating in the Air Force missileer ranks may have been commonplace for years and perhaps decades. This significant lapse in integrity was never surfaced or corrected and was simply accepted.

Moreover, many of the problems surfaced in the press by AP [Associated Press] reporter Bob Burns and the Air Force first minimized these issues. Moving forward, Congress must be informed of any ongoing or new problems as well as the progress to correct these issues.

Effective change in leadership and culture may take time, but must begin immediately. We cannot accept risks when it comes to our nuclear arsenal.

I would like to thank Chairman Thornberry and Chairwoman Hartzler for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Speier.

Members of the committee who are not assigned to this subcommittee could be with us today. Therefore, pursuant to committee procedure, I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be permitted to participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.

Is there objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members, will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.

Now, I am happy to introduce our witnesses. Dr. Yisroel Brumer is the director for Strategic, Defensive and Space Programs at the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The office is tasked with tracking, monitoring, and independently assessing the implementation of the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review.

Vice Admiral Terry Benedict is the director of the U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs. He directs the training, systems,

equipment, facilities, and personnel of the Navy's strategic weapons.

Major General Jack Weinstein is the commander of the 12th Air Force and is responsible for the Nation's intercontinental ballistic missile force.

Major General Richard Clark is the commander of the 8th Air Force which oversees the Air Force nuclear bombers.

So, Dr. Brumer, we will start with you for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. YISROEL BRUMER, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC, DEFENSIVE, AND SPACE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to join you today. And I do appreciate the opportunity to testify about how my team is executing the tasks resulting from the recent internal and external reviews of the nuclear enterprise directed by former Secretary Hagel.

These reviews concluded that without intervention, issues relating to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have put the nuclear enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems than we have previously witnessed.

Former Secretary Hagel directed the Department to place a renewed emphasis on the nuclear force. He specifically charged the director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of the review's recommendations with particular focus on assessing the health of the nuclear enterprise. He also tasked us to provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and regular updates to the Secretary.

Our team includes current and former Active Duty military members as well as scientists and data experts to support technical assessments. This team has shown unwavering dedication to improving the enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective analysis, data, and assessments possible.

Senior leadership has been keenly interested in comprehensive and sustainable solutions rather than short-term efforts that merely check boxes without placing the enterprise on more solid footing.

This charge has proven to be the most important and the most difficult aspect of our task. It is easy to verify an instruction has been modified to relieve the force of an unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has been delivered. It is much more difficult to measure changes in culture or personal attitudes toward the mission. We believe this kind of analysis is important to facilitate real change while also remaining vigilant to identify unintended second- and third-order effects.

Our team has made significant strides in a short time. Since September, we have distilled every possible recommendation from the reviews. We have held meetings with all the stakeholders and formulated problem statements identifying the root cause of each issue. We have worked with each responsible organization to develop detailed approaches, metrics, and milestones.

Finally, to go beyond box-checking, we developed metrics to determine whether we are achieving the desired intent to improve the overall health of the enterprise.

Additionally, we are visiting key locations to become more familiar with unique mission and quality-of-life challenges as well as to hold non-attributional discussions to gather empirical data and learn what issues are most pressing.

Assessing the overall health will prove challenging and we recognize it will take years of dedicated effort to restore the risk margin that has been lost. We intend to provide leadership with our best analysis and advice to help them guide these efforts to completion.

Our team has embraced this challenge and they are proud to have been entrusted with the role of ensuring issues are addressed to provide the Nation with the safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is so critical to our national security.

I will continue to report our progress on a regular basis. You have my assurance we will remain vigilant and we will maintain our honesty and integrity for as long as the Secretary of Defense and this committee deem our services worthy and necessary.

Thank you for your time and I do welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brumer can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Dr. Brumer.

Admiral Benedict, now we turn to you.

STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral BENEDICT. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. I represent the men and women of our Navy's Strategic Systems Programs or SSP. Your continue support of our deterrence mission is appreciated, and I thank you.

As the director of SSP, it is my responsibility to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety and the security of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent capability, the TRIDENT II (D5) Strategic Weapons System.

My written statement, which I respectfully request be submitted for the record, addresses the Navy's top priorities for maintaining a credible, effective, and safe sea-based strategic deterrent.

The Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise Review or NER incorporated input on the nuclear forces as well as the supporting infrastructure to build, maintain, and control these assets.

The NER provided the Navy an unbiased look and ultimately found that the nuclear enterprise is safe, secure, and effective today. However, as we all know, it found evidence of systemic problems that, if not addressed, could undermine the safety, security, and effectiveness of elements of the nuclear forces in the future.

The Navy has taken significant steps to implement corrective action for the recommendations. The Navy will continue to actively work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Congress to implement solutions across the fleet to ensure safety and reliability. The Navy's investments will include infrastructure sustainment and improvements in personnel, training, and accountability.

Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy has nominated me to be the regulator for oversight of the Navy nuclear deterrent mission in order to sharpen our operational focus. As the Navy's regulator, I report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on nuclear force readiness.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am pleased to answer your questions when appropriate.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Admiral.

General Weinstein.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JACK WEINSTEIN, USAF, COMMANDER, 20TH AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General WEINSTEIN. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to appear before you and represent the over 10,000 intercontinental ballistic missile professionals of 20th Air Force.

Every day, across 33,600 square miles in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, more than 900 airmen are deployed to launch facilities and missile alert facilities to provide our Nation a credible around-the-clock nuclear deterrent, poised and ready when called upon by the President.

I am immensely proud of the fine Americans serving in the ICBM mission as I know you are and I share in your view that we must continue to provide them the training, professional development, and resources they need to accomplish this critical national mission.

The airmen of 20th Air Force are benefiting greatly from improvements we have implemented based on the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review and Air Force reviews.

The support we have received from Congress, the highest levels of the Department of Defense, and senior leaders of the United States Air Force has allowed us to address shortfalls and reaffirm the Air Force's commitment to the nuclear mission as the number one priority.

As commander of the operational ICBM force, I continue to focus on the Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendation to rebuild culture and improve morale. The actions we have taken over the last 18 months are moving us in the right direction, providing our airmen with the proper equipment and empowering them to make decisions, developing each of them not just as technical experts but as leaders.

As we fully implement resource and programmatic improvements to the ICBM mission, we will continue to rebuild a culture that is foundational to continuing and enduring improvement.

We will remain attuned to our frontline airmen for their feedback and to our commanders and enlisted leaders in the missile fields to ensure we make informed decisions to execute our mission exceptionally well and develop tomorrow's nuclear leaders.

Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss 20th Air Force and the ICBM mission. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Weinstein can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General.

And now last but not least, General Clark.

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN RICHARD M. CLARK, USAF, COMMANDER, 8TH AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

General CLARK. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today to represent the men and women of the 8th Air Force.

Let me say first that the men and women are of the Mighty 8th are doing a fantastic job every day providing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force for our Nation while assuring we are prepared to execute our conventional mission any time, anywhere on the planet.

Over the last year, we implemented many changes based on feedback from airmen carrying out the nuclear mission and we are constantly assessing where we still need to improve.

The numerous changes we have instituted are completely in line with the internal and external Nuclear Enterprise Reviews conducted last year. With the support of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as well as the leadership of the Secretary of Defense, we restored our nuclear focus, are pursuing essential modernization efforts, and are making key quality of life enhancements for our airmen.

We are funding 156 manpower positions across our 3 bases, providing relief to our most understaffed specialties, and will soon open a 34-person operations and maintenance detachment in Anderson Air Force Base Guam to provide needed support to the continuous bomber presence mission.

We recently conducted a headquarters force improvement program and will begin addressing the findings in the coming days and weeks. Our airmen have a voice and we are listening. Maintaining readiness is a testament to our airmen's dedication, commitment, and expertise. But we are operating 50-year old aircraft and are now at the point where we can no longer postpone upgrades.

Modernization efforts aimed at our existing B–2 and B–52 aircraft and associated weapons as well as the new long-range strike bomber are critical to preserving our dominance against next-generation capabilities.

Modernization is also a means of bridging the say-do gap and showing our airmen that the mission they perform day in and day out is important to their Nation. We realize these upgrades come at a cost and we are working with our ICBM and Navy partners to find areas of intelligent commonality.

Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you again for the support of your committee and for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss 8th Air Force. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 56.]

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your statements and your comments.

I guess I want to just start with Dr. Brumer, my questions. Over the last 9 years, 24 unclassified and classified reports sanctioned by the Department have assessed, identified, and proposed remedies to issues within our nuclear enterprise. Yet, you still describe in your written testimony that the two most recent reviews concluded that without interruption issues relating to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have the nuclear enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems that we have previously witnessed. So what additional unacceptable events need to occur in order for the Department to wholeheartedly implement and sustain the recommendations in the two most recent reports on the nuclear enterprise?

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you, Chairwoman. That is an extremely important question. When we started this effort, we spent a fair bit of time asking how do we ensure that this is not just the latest in a series of attempts to fix the problem and, you know, that we are not having these conversations again in a few years.

Our assessment is that what has happened in the past, there were a number of reviews, they made hundreds of recommendations, and the services took those recommendations seriously but implemented them with more of a box-checking mentality. There is a set of things to do, I have done them, I can now close them out rather than having an enduring focus on the mission and follow-on assessments, you know, whether we are having the intended effect. We are all committed to making sure that doesn't happen this time. And that is very much at the heart of what we are doing.

So there are recommendations from the reviews. We are tracking to make sure that those [are] implemented. We are also paying very close attention to whether we are achieving the desired effect, whether we are having unintended consequences that are creating new risks or whether new risks that we simply haven't seen before are arising to make sure we are aware of them before a review is required.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I read your testimony as well as part of the report and it seems like you have got a lot of the matrixes in place for process as well as product and you have got a process to monitor in place. But what have you seen so far of actually recommendations that have been made that you can say have been achieved? Can you give us some of the successes that have occurred that you have monitored?

Dr. BRUMER. Yes, absolutely. What I would say is at the moment there is a comprehensive effort across the Department to address all of the review's recommendations.

By far, the most important thing that has occurred has been the involvement by the senior leadership in the Department personally, the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy, have been very personally involved holding regular meetings to hold the senior leadership accountable. That is without question what is most different this time and that has been very much the engine for a different atmosphere this time around.

There are a number of other recommendations that have already been implemented, the Air Force elevating Global Strike Command from a three-star to a four-star, as example, standing up a senior

leadership forum to have discussions. And maybe the services want to talk more specifically about what is happening, but there has been money spent, actions taken, people held accountable. It has been significant.

That said, it is early in the process and we are continuing to monitor the impact, but we expect this to take years before we will be able to say that the risk margin has been regained.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much.

Major General Clark, this committee has been very supportive of Air Force efforts to recapitalize the bomber fleet with the new long-range strike bomber. Knowing that operational fielding of the new bomber is still a decade away, what is the Air Force's philosophy on how it will approach which bomber fleet will be recapitalized first? And given the Air Force's goal to procure 80 to 100 new bombers, will the long-range strike bomber eventually replace all types of bombers in a single peer fleet?

General CLARK. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. We are developing a bomber roadmap that will address the concerns that you are discussing. And the bottom line to that is it is going to take all three of these—all three of our current bombers in our bomber fleet to get us to the point where we have the LRSB, the long-range strike bomber in order.

So what it is going to require is modernization and sustainment of the B–52 and the B–2 in particular for the nuclear mission. And we do have plans in place, the President's budget does address those. Now it is a matter of committing to the roadmap that we develop to get us to that next step for the LRSB.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Once it comes online, will it replace eventually all three with one?

General CLARK. Yes, ma'am. Eventually, it will replace. It will be the long-range strike bomber for us at a point.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. I will withhold my other questions, give my colleagues and my ranking member a chance to ask questions.

Ranking Member Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just ask each of you briefly. I would like you to respond briefly to the affordability issue. We don't have the willingness to tax ourselves to properly support defense. So how would you—how do we deal with this affordability issue?

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. I think the Deputy Secretary put it the best this morning he said this is the number one priority. We are going to have to fund it. That means either additional funds will be required or there will be very difficult choices made about mission risk in other important areas.

Admiral BENEDICT. Ma'am, I think there are two ways to address affordability. One is to very carefully and diligently scrutinize requirements and I will tell you in the *Ohio* replacement program, we have spent the last number of years ensuring that that scrub has been done.

The second aspect and it is one that we are working within the Navy very closely with the Air Force is the issue of commonality. As we look at the systems and we are both on this—on the path to modernize the systems, where could we, where should we strive

for commonality between the SLBMs, the submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the ICBMs, the land-based. That is an effort that is being championed at the RDA level, the Assistant Secretary level with the support of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] so, I think those two aspects address affordability.

General WEINSTEIN. We are working really closely with the United States Navy as Admiral Benedict talked about when it comes to commonality. We are fortunate that Admiral Haney, the combatant commander holds stakeholder meetings.

The most recent ICBM stakeholder meeting where we talked about sustainment issues in the force as well as modernization issues in the force, we have Admiral Benedict to attend to the stakeholder meetings on ICBM so we can address corporately what resource needs we have in the future and what components using commonality in a smart manner can you use for both the SLBM force and the ICBM force.

And I believe by working together as a team you can look at this commonality whether it is in the propulsion system, whether it is in the guidance system, and I think by looking at commonality is where you can find a common ground in order to do what is best for the American taxpayer to provide a capability that this Nation greatly needs.

Ms. SPEIER. Major General Clark, do you have anything to add?

General CLARK. Ma'am, I don't have anything really to add other than what was already said.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you.

General Weinstein, Congress was alerted to the cheating and morale problems through press articles. We weren't informed by any of the executives within the military. Why were we not alerted to the problem initially? Did you not know about it either?

General WEINSTEIN. I knew completely about it and I will tell you when I found out about it exactly and then who I notified. And, we were hosting, it was early January, hosting the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Hagel was there. I found out on that day that there was a drug investigation ongoing and that drug investigation, besides touching other Air Force installations, touched crew members at one of my installations at Malmstrom.

I told the Secretary of Defense immediately when I found out and then we informed our senior leadership at that time. As the operational——

Ms. SPEIER. How about the Congress?

General WEINSTEIN. Well, as the operational commander, I worked for the Commander of Global Strike Command of the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command and those people were told immediately that there was a problem.

Ms. SPEIER. That doesn't respond to Congress not being told about it until they read about it in the paper. All right. One of the recommendations was to guarantee one of the missileers the top three choices for next assignment. Has the Air Force been able to fulfill that promise?

General WEINSTEIN. We are working diligently on that promise.

Ms. SPEIER. Does that mean you are executing it or not?

General WEINSTEIN. We are executing—let me first—if I—if you please give me time—what we are executing is a change to the way

we do training and evaluation in the ICBM business, to empower our airmen to give them proper training. And that was one of the issues that the Secretary of the Air Force explained immediately after visiting the bases.

Because of that, we have changed our crew force structure from a 4-year crew tour into a "3+3" crew tour which is 3 years at an operational base where you are a deputy or a missile combat crew commander and then over to being an instructor, evaluator, or a flight commander.

By changing that 3+3 structure, we have seen a decrease in the last two developmental teams and those are the teams that get together to vector crew members after their first 3-year assignment because based on the 3+3 structure, we require additional crew members for that.

So, we have fallen below that 90 percent on two development teams and we are going to work on that. The one data point that I think is extremely important is we assign people to their assignments based on two factors. Factor one is how well are you doing in your current assignment because it is a merit-based process. And number two is where are there openings in the new career field because not every career field has an opening at the same time every single year.

When we look at the top 50 percent of ICBM crew members receiving their top three preferences one, two, or three, in the last board, 100 percent got—of the top 50 percent, got one of their three assignments. So, we are striving hard to make sure we can meet the needs of the individual, at the same time meet the needs of the service.

Ms. SPEIER. So, you are saying the top 50 percent, so the bottom 50 percent didn't get their choices, is that what you are saying?

General WEINSTEIN. No. When I looked at the data for that one, for the top three preferences overall, it is above 80 percent.

Ms. SPEIER. Okay.

General WEINSTEIN. So, we are taking care of everyone in the enterprise.

Ms. SPEIER. So, there is a huge morale problem, correct?

General WEINSTEIN. No, ma'am, I disagree. There was——

Ms. SPEIER. But there has been a huge morale problem.

General WEINSTEIN. There was a huge morale problem before we started the changes.

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Is there anything that requires this 24-hour-on system? I mean, why not 12 hours?

General WEINSTEIN. Over the years, we have looked at the best way to man an operational force that requires to be on alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. By looking at the 24-hour schedule, that was the best schedule that supports the ability to man the mission as well as to take care of the people.

One thing we have implemented which has been a great morale booster is a change in the alert schedule. The previous alert schedule had an individual that would go on alert, for example, on a Monday. They would come back on a Tuesday and would have to work again on Wednesday.

That doesn't work at a place like Malmstrom Air Force Base which has the largest missile field and especially in the winter people would be coming back at 3, 4, 5 o'clock at night.

We have introduced a schedule that we are calling ATOX which is they are on alert on a Monday. They travel back on Tuesday. They have Wednesday as a day off. And then on Thursday, they can either pull alerts or go into training.

In February of this year, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force brought all the four-stars and directors from the Air Staff to Minot Air Force Base for a nuclear oversight board and one of the many boards that we have to make sure that we keep on track with all the changes.

And then in the launch control center, one of the four-stars in the United States Air Force asked a crew member what was the best part about her job. And she answered it was the schedule. So, we have improved morale greatly by changing the schedule which allows us to maintain the mission for Admiral Haney at the same time taking care of the airmen.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. My understanding is that there used to be an annual competition between the Navy and Air Force but that has been discontinued. My understanding was that it used to build team spirit and lift the morale and help the nuclear enterprise officers to hone their skills throughout the year. Is this something that is worthy of being reinstated?

General WEINSTEIN. We have reinstated. Personally, I have been a missileer for over 32 years and I don't recall a competition combined with the United States Navy but we have instituted—my boss, Lieutenant General Wilson, Global Strike Challenge, that is a competition. We did one last year. We are doing one this year.

We took a gap for a year or two based on sequestration and not having the available funds. But we have instituted a competition. That competition includes ICBM forces and as well as bomber forces and it is a great camaraderie-builder as well as improving the mission.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Representative.

We will go to another member of the subcommittee, Representative Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and thank you for hosting this hearing today.

And let me get back to my notes. The Nuclear Enterprise Review, the NER, stated that prior reviews had taken place and that many key recommendations from those reviews had only marginal impact.

The NER also stated that expectations are high that this time the response would be both sustained and effective. How can you assure the subcommittee that the necessary focus will remain on implementing the recommendations and how will you keep sustained attention on the issues within each of your respective services. And I would like to get a response to that from all of the witnesses but starting from Major Clark and then General Weinstein.

General CLARK. Sir, I think the—as Dr. Brumer mentioned in his opening statement——

Mr. JOHNSON. And I am sorry, Major General. I am sorry.

General CLARK. Yes, sir, I understood. I have been called Major before, too. That is okay.

Mr. JOHNSON. We will just keep it at General.

General CLARK. Yes, sir. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

General CLARK. As Dr. Brumer mentioned in his statement I think that the last time we went through this type of effort in the enterprise it was somewhat of a box-check mentality. What we see this time and what I see as a new commander is that this really is a—it is a top-down effort because we are getting a significant amount of support from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, our Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Wilson, who is the Air Force Global Strike Commander, top-down attention on the issues that we are facing.

But we are also getting bottom-up attention. And our airmen are empowered this time to actually have a voice to help us to determine where the areas that we need to look at, areas that we need to improve upon. And when you have the top-down coupled with the bottom-up approach, I think that breeds a recipe for success for us. So, that is one major change that I think is along the way.

And ultimately what I think happens here is we are going to get a culture change. And it is something that is going to be woven throughout the command because people believe it, people own it. They understand the purpose and they are empowered to do something about it. So, I think this time is different than before because it is not just a box-check mentality.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

General CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. General Weinstein.

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you for the question. This review is different than previous ones. I would like to talk about what we did based on the cheating scandal at Malmstrom. We did three separate investigations because of the cheating scandal internal to the United States Air Force before the Secretary of Defense did the Nuclear Enterprise Review.

The first thing we did was the commander directed an investigation that looked at the leadership at Malmstrom. The second item we did was a group that had an organizational behavior specialist on it to find out how did we get that way and that was the senior operational training and evaluation group, had an ICBM person and a bomber person on it.

Just like Admiral Benedict talked about commonality, there is commonality on how to solve problems. And my boss, Lieutenant General Wilson, worked with the commander of SUBLANT [Submarine Force Atlantic] and a fellow task force commander Vice Admiral Mike Connor and developed a program called the Force Improvement Program that General Clark just talked about.

The Force Improvement Program then went out and talked to the airmen. And we broke it up into many different subspecialties. We broke it up into operations, maintenance, support, helicopters, and operations. We received numerous items, over 350 recommendations. Those were 350 recommendations that came from the airmen.

The only two people that were allowed to say no to one of those recommendations were myself and General Wilson. We spent 3 days at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to review all those items. From those items, we came up with how we are going to improve the culture and the commitment in the ICBM force.

When you look at the Nuclear Enterprise Review, there is 90 percent congruence between what the Nuclear Enterprise Review came and then what occurred during the Force Improvement Program. And then, as we have talked about before, it is leadership commitment; myself, General Clark, Vice Admiral Benedict, we attend meetings with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense].

The Secretary of Air Force has visited our bases more than any other bases so it is the leadership commitment and it is the commitment from the airmen and the leaders that are making a difference this time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Madam Chair, if I could hear from Admiral Benedict on this also. Thank you.

Admiral BENEDICT. Congressman, thank you. Sir, I will reiterate what my Air Force counterpart has said. I think, first and foremost, it is the attention by senior leadership. Going back to 2007 when Secretary Schlesinger and Admiral Donald conducted internal reviews of the Navy's position, we have implemented 100 percent of those findings.

We continually assess ourselves every 2 years. We knew that we had issues with infrastructure and personnel before the SECDEF reviews last summer. But the senior commitment not only in attention to detail but also financially has allowed us to move those two areas at a much more rapid pace to ensure that we are fully in support of this mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And with that, I will yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Now, we will go to Representative Zinke.

Mr. ZINKE. I want to thank you, Madam Chairman. As you know, I represent Montana, the sole Congressman from the great State that has Malmstrom. And thank you, sir. And I am also a former SEAL [Sea, Air, Land forces] commander and I have concerns as I have been through multiple hearings about one, is there is this wave that would think that the triad is no longer relevant given that the bombers face enormous challenges, that our diminishing submarine force and disruptive technology, which makes them more difficult in that mission.

And there are some that would suggest that the land-based ICBMs are no longer required. Given that disruptive technology can have a severe and overnight effect with our submarine force, our Air Force still is challenged with aging aircraft, it leads to the missile base.

And do you share that opinion that without the missile base we are putting our country's deterrence at great risk?

General WEINSTEIN. I think the ICBM force like the bomber force and the sea-launched ballistic missile force are absolutely critical to the defense of our Nation. I think sometimes we need to look at the problems through the eyes of our adversary. And if you look at

some of our other nations—and if you look at other nations, other nations are investing in a new ICBM, whether it is a mobile ICBM or replacing all their other ICBMs. And other nations are trying to develop capability.

I think the ICBM force provides a unique capability. It is an on-alert force 24 hours a day, 7 days a week that is used every single day to protect this Nation. It is used every single day in a deterrent role. And I think this is not the Cold War. This isn't a Cold War force.

But if we look at the world environment today, it is more dangerous than the Cold War and more unpredictable, and the ICBM force is as valid today as it was in 1960s.

Mr. ZINKE. And Admiral, I got in the Navy in 1984. And my assessment today is there are more threats, more asymmetrical threats than when I first came in. Do you also share the view that today we face a heightened threat as opposed to the Cold War?

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir, I do. And, in fact, that has been the topic of much discussion as we have gone through the requirement scrub that I alluded to earlier as we have gone through the design phase of the *Ohio* replacement.

That platform will be in the water through approximately 2084. And so, as we try and project out the threats through that timeframe, the major focus of the requirements scrub was to ensure that we had technical margin to ensure that while we can't predict the future, we can certainly ensure that we don't find ourselves surprised in the future. And so, I would agree with you wholeheartedly, sir.

Mr. ZINKE. And Major General Clark, as the last part of the triad, the aging B–52s, could you explain what the process is and how long you expect those aircraft to stay in service?

General CLARK. Sir, we expect the B–52 to be in service for up to 25 more years. And through a series of sustainment and modernization programs that we have intact, we have a good plan to keep it viable.

But I would like to address another point that you made about its relevance right now. The bomber fleet is the most flexible and the most visible part of the triad. That is what the bomber fleet offers. And I think from a flexibility standpoint, there is not a lot of argument there. It has certainly—delivers a wide array of weapons effects.

It can do it in a wide array of timespan as well. But as far as the visibility, I just want to point one example to you. About 2 weeks ago, we had B–52s in the United Kingdom participating in an exercise in the Baltics. And as the B–52s were flying in the Baltic region, one of our B–52s was intercepted by a Russian fighter. And that Russian fighter pulled in to an observation position to monitor the B–52's activity. Our Swedish allies rejoined and the Russian fighter left. And what that shows is that the B–52 is still relevant because it is visible.

Our allies see it. Our adversaries see it and it is in a deterrent role every day, so I strongly disagree with any notion that it is no longer relevant to our force.

Mr. ZINKE. We used to have B–52s in Glasgow, Montana, and you are welcome back anytime. And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here, for your service to our country. This is for any one of you. The changes per the Nuclear Enterprise Review, how are they going to be institutionalized?

I am worried long-term after Deputy Secretary Work is gone, I am worried about continued leadership and culture focus because obviously, we know there is a new heightened awareness now that the problems and a new zeal for resolving them, but that can wane and atrophy over time, so what are your thoughts about that?

And I would open that up to any one of you.

Admiral BENEDICT. Thank you, sir. One of the benefits that I enjoy within the Navy is that my mission is performed by professional submariners who basically take their platform to sea.

And so the fundamental professional aspects of attention to detail as you take a submarine and prepare to dive and then execute your mission underwater with the preparation to resurface, again drives a very strong culture of self-assessment in a different light.

So I reap the benefits of that philosophy, that culture bleeding over to and supporting the Strategic Weapons System which is the sole purpose of an SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine]. So from that aspect, I think we are strongly rooted in the overall culture of the submarine force.

Going all the way back to 2007, one of the main objectives coming out of those two investigations was to develop within SSP a culture of self-assessment, and that is what instituted the biannual reviews that I conduct on myself and then those are reviewed as part of the larger Navy biannual assessment.

So we don't let it spike and wane. We are taking a constant strain on a biannual basis to ensure that that culture remains strong and growing in the right direction.

Mr. ROGERS. General Weinstein, not everybody has the luxury of an 8-year assignment like Admiral Benedict which would help with long-term institutionalization and focus. What are your thoughts about how you are going to see that—this vigor remain present?

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir. And it is a—it was an honor to host you and Congressman Cooper to Minot in the winter.

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. In December, let's tell everybody.

General WEINSTEIN. In December. As I mentioned earlier, the Force Improvement Program, which was the grassroots effort to get the lower ranking individuals in the organization and get their inputs. The key is leadership at the higher levels and we have talked about that, but to me it is the lower levels that believe in what we are doing is right.

I had a captain in my office a few months ago and the captain looked at me and said, "General, you don't have to tell me"—this is before we made all the changes—"General, you don't have to tell me my job is important. I know it is important. Just let me do it."

And I was having dinner with some airmen at Minot Air Force Base and the senior airman looked at me and goes, "Sir, morale is

my problem not your problem." A culture to change requires people at the lower levels to believe in what you are doing. And what I am seeing across the entire ICBM force is they believe in what we are doing and they are grabbing onto it themselves.

So the concern—and my crew members have had the same concern about when leadership leaves. They don't want to see this go the way of other reviews. But what is different this time is we listened to them at the very beginning on what their problems were and they can see concrete examples of what we are doing to fix it.

When we told them they needed new crew vehicles to go to the field, within a matter of 4 months they all had new crew vehicles to go to the field. When we told the cops that they have an extremely important job and they need to be in the proper uniform, we got them the camouflage pattern that is in Afghanistan and every one of my deployed airmen has those when they go out to the missile field. They are seeing concrete items. And the one item——

Mr. ROGERS. They are seeing, they build that sense of enthusiasm because they see it from you. They see that you let them know what they do matters. I know Admiral Benedict does that.

He is going to do it for a number of years, but you are going to move on to the next assignment pretty soon. And I am just worried about whoever follows in your shoes that they let that missileer know what you do is really doggone important, that B–52 pilot, so that is what I worry about. How is that going to be continued after your move on to your next assignment?

General WEINSTEIN. Sir, I think it is the trust in the senior leadership of the secretary and chief for putting the right people in command of my organization. Just like putting General Rand in command of Global Strike Command is the right for the United States Air Force for the first four-star. It is senior leaders picking the right commanders and then it is empowering and trusting your airmen, that they can see that they have a voice and they have an impact.

Mr. ROGERS. But they get that from the top. That is the thing. And I agree about the flag officer. I think that is a good move. It shows commitment by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense.

But this has to be continued. And that is what I worry about long-term. I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to follow up on a question that Representative Speier had, bringing up the incident of the cheating. And was wondering if Admiral and General Weinstein, if you could explain about some of the changes that you are doing with testing and with evaluation of the airmen and the sailors.

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate the question. What we have done is we have completely restructured the way we have done training and evaluation in the ICBM force. The way we used to do training—training was evaluation, so a crew member would take 47 tests per year and every test was a certification.

Every time they went into the missile procedure trainer, our simulator, they were being evaluated. Well, that is not the right way to want to motivate a force. It is not the right way to train a force.

We also, opposed to the aviation community, the less alerts you pulled the better crew member you were, which makes no sense. In the flying side, the more flight hours you have the better aviator you are.

That is why we have come up with the 3+3 construct which is the first 3 years you are a deputy missile combat crew commander then you are a missile combat crew commander, and the most important piece is being in the missile field.

We have changed the way we do training. They have two trainer rides a month. One they select themselves to hone their skills. They take one closed-book test, it is called boldface for those most important things per year—excuse me per month and then we have gone to the aviation side which is instead of a 12-month evaluation we are in an 18-month evaluation.

Another critical item we have done is we put leaders in the field to lead from the front. In our business, the only person that pulled alerts other than crew members were a squadron commander. We now have wing commanders, vice wing commanders, and group commanders, all pulling alerts so we have senior people, so we have completely restructured the way we have done training and put missile combat crew commanders in charge of training. And that whole concept of empowering our best and brightest lieutenants to lead is the way we have structured the entire force.

Mrs. HARTZLER. No doubt that is an impact to the morale.

Admiral.

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, ma'am. So in my discussions with Admiral Richardson who is head of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, the cheating scandal that occurred down in Charleston, and he spent an inordinate amount of personal professional time in personally understanding what happened down there.

I think first and foremost, I can say with confidence that that is not a systemic problem down there. That was a group of—a very small cloistered group of individuals who chose to cheat.

And in fact, it was the culture of self-assessment and honor, integrity, that allowed another instructor to identify that to the system that there was this small group of individuals. Admiral Richardson has chosen not just to address that problem but to look at the very nature of what would cause that, so he has gone through and looked at the rotation from sea duty to shore duty, to understand what was driving that behavior.

He spent an excessive amount of time understanding the very nature of cheating, he has gone to I know the University of Notre Dame and talked to experts around the Nation trying to understand what drives people to break the ethics and integrity thresholds.

And he has put in place, I think a strong measure that ensures that the aspects of coming off of arduous sea duty into instructive duty down in his prototypes does not drive—is not the causal factor for those young men and women to cheat.

So I think that we have looked at not just the symptom, but I think Admiral Richardson to his credit has gone to the root cause to find the motivational factors and has taken concrete steps to ensure that he gets to that problem.

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is very encouraging. Sequestration over the past 2 years has obviously harmed efforts to organize, train, equip, modernize, and maintain readiness of our nuclear forces. This year both the House and the Senate have passed authorization bills that meet the President's requested funding level by increasing the amount of authorized OCO [overseas contingency operations] funds.

In your professional judgment, and this is for all of you, do you foresee any difficulties because of the mechanism by which funding is provided to the Department by Congress in implementing the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Dr. Brumer.

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. It is an important question. At the core of all of these discussions, and it has come up today and it comes up a lot in the Pentagon, is that this is an effort that requires enduring, sustained attention.

And so last year in the Future Years Defense Program, the Department added $8 billion to address the recommendations of the reviews that will be reconsidered this year to see whether that was sufficient, whether there are additional ways to gain efficiency. But it is something that is going to require sustained attention; and the fiscal uncertainty associated with sequestration has, you know, it puts that at risk.

Additionally, I will note that when I talk to the forces in the field, they are very aware of the things that are happening out here. They have been very encouraged by the activities in the Pentagon and hear these discussions as well as the additional funds that are coming, but that is a question that comes up a lot and somewhat undermines the message, the question of, you know, will this be sustainable given the fiscal uncertainty the Department of Defense faces.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Admiral.

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, ma'am. I would agree with Dr. Brumer. As I stated earlier, I have 69 more years of requirements to support the Strategic Weapons System, and as I think we have all stated here at the table, stability of and continuity of both personnel and resources is paramount to being able to execute that effectively.

So while we truly appreciate the support of Congress, OCO funds is somewhat counter-culture to that stable platform that I think we would all desire.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

General Weinstein.

General WEINSTEIN. I completely agree with Admiral Benedict. It is really the consistency of funding; you know, as the operational commander, we need capability. And for the ICBM force, in the budget is a new payload transporter, which is the big white truck that brings the weapon as well as other capability out to the missile field.

A new helicopter is absolutely critical to our ability to secure the force. And if you don't have consistency of funding for our acquisition airmen that are trying to buy this new capability that we need, the lack of consistency is really concerning because to my airmen, they will view this lack of consistency of funding as stepping

back from the improvements to the Nuclear Enterprise Review because where the rubber meets the road is they want the new truck or they want to see the new helicopter and if we don't have consistency, that will undermine the improvements to the enterprise.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay.

General Clark.

General CLARK. Ma'am, I agree with what everyone else said. It does have an impact on culture. And when we have airmen flying bombers that their grandfathers flew and then they see that the LRSB, which is critical to our future and the long range standoff munition, another critical piece, when they see those at risk because of the inconsistency and the uncertainty it does have an impact on morale.

And it makes them question just how important the mission really is. So we can do all we can do as leaders, but like General Weinstein said, where the rubber hits the road is what our country really puts forward for them to do their mission.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Ranking Member Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

You had referenced, I think, it was you, General Weinstein, that you had some 350 recommendations from the airmen. Would you make that list available to us so we can review them?

General WEINSTEIN. Yes, I will.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. I just want to read—I want to ask you one question. Evidently, there are some court-martials underway right now that I am curious what the results have been. Let's see, there are four court-martials for drug use, rape, assault, sexual assault on an unconscious person, and larceny. And then at Malmstrom, from there two missileers that are being court-martialed for using and selling bath salts, a synthetic substance that can render users psychotic.

And at Warren three airmen have received—have recently been or are due to be court-martialed for drunk driving, using and selling pot, and indecent filming of the private areas of another person without consent. Are those cases ongoing right now?

General WEINSTEIN. Some of those I am familiar with, others I am not. I can provide the committee information you need on ongoing military justice cases in my command.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

Ms. SPEIER. All right, if you would do so, I am curious when this conduct was going on and to you, Admiral Benedict as well to the extent that you have—there is this belief that you all have that morale is much better. And we want to believe that as well, but the extent that this kind of conduct is—was going on by missileers is very troubling I think to all of us.

There was one reference made that—I just want to read this to you. After 2 years at F.E. Warren [Air Force Base], so you could—one of the missileers said he "could complete a launch exercise in less than a minute, between scenes of Mad Men or bites of a burger. Once missileers learn their checklists by rote, many of them have hours of idle time on their hands. Some binge-watch TV or

read, a few study for advanced degrees. Inside the capsules little has changed since the Cold War, from the constant vibrations and foot odor to the 8-inch floppy disks in the consoles. 'It is absolutely all the same whether it is Christmas Day or the Fourth of July. . . You are in a constant state of jetlag. You are up [at] 1 a.m. under fluorescent lights. After a year and a half I was never fully awake or fully asleep. You reach this zombie state.'

"Sleep deprivation is known to induce hallucinations and impaired judgment. The CO_2 levels in the silos don't always meet OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] standards either. The combined effect may make missileers groggy and even impulsive and aggressive."

So that gets to that whole issue of 24-hour sets of duty and the impact that that has in creating fatigue. I could just tell you, I am one of those Members that flies from San Francisco to Washington every week. I am always on the wrong time zone and my body is always fatigued. Now, my responsibilities aren't as serious as those of the missileers but I feel it, so I am curious. I know sometimes there is this sense that we have got to be tough.

In medical school and upon graduating and being residents, 24 hours, 36 hours in an emergency room was like a rite of passage, until we realized that people were dying because of it. I am just curious whether you have seriously looked at whether these issues are real and whether they should be adjusted.

General WEINSTEIN. First of all, if you are referencing a recent article that was published, I find it interesting that it is one individual that makes a comment and we don't discuss with other members of that F.E. Warren Air Force Base. Let me go into some facts.

Some of the facts are that is why we have 350-plus recommendations on what we need to do to fix. One of the comments you made about the, I will say dirty capsules, we have program now where we are doing deep cleaning of launch control centers for the first time since we have had launch control centers.

So when you walk into one of my launch control centers at any of the bases that have been deep cleaned, you do not smell anything other than a clean capsule. I discussed how we changed the crew force from going from an alert travel day to going right back to work. We have completely structured that.

We have restructured training. And when I talked about the 3+3 schedule, so some of the concerns from that one individual, all those problems are problems that do not exist in the force because we have attacked those problems.

Also, we are hiring at all the bases physiologists that can help people when it comes to what is the proper diet you need to be on as well as the proper sleep schedule and that whole piece. So from that comment, that is not what I am seeing in the force.

I am seeing a force that sees the changes we are making. The changes that they requested based on being the airmen and pulling the alerts, the changes in training and evaluation, the new vehicles, the new crew schedule, upgrades to the launch control center that is in work—that is why consistency of funding is important to get rid of the 8-inch floppy disks that you referenced—so there has been a massive change in how we treat our airmen. There has been

a massive change in how we are sustaining the weapon system, and some of those comments from previous people that were in the ICBM field are no longer valid.

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Well, we would appreciate those 350 recommendations, thank you.

General CLARK. Ma'am, can I add a point to General Weinstein?

Ms. SPEIER. Certainly.

General CLARK. I would just like to say in regards to the 24-hours in a launch control center, you can talk to General Tibbets or any other bomber pilot and you will find people flying sorties anywhere from 18 to 44 hours in a space a third as big as a launch control center in a seat, very confined quarters and it really is just—it is a part of what we do. It is a part of how we do business.

But we prepare ourselves to do that just as the missileers do. So granted it is tough duty, but it is something that I think isn't out of the ordinary in the nuclear business and it is something that our airmen are prepared to do.

Ms. SPEIER. Major General, I recognize that and I could just substitute the chief of academics at a medical school saying exactly the same thing. And it wasn't until there were deaths caused by emergency room interns and residents that were sleep deprived that we started to change that process. I think you should look at it. And I will leave it at that. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Representative Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. For each one of you, I would like to ask which one of the NER recommendations poses the most significant challenge to implement and explain the factors that make implementation of that recommendation challenging. Starting with you again, General Clark.

General CLARK. Sir, I think some of the recommendations that are associated with resources and garnering more resources to implement are the most challenging for us, because there is, as we talked about before, a bit of uncertainty as to what resources we are going to have to do these things.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Other than resources.

General CLARK. Okay.

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought you were going to go there.

General CLARK. Yes, sir. Well, then I guess my next answer would be the cultural change because culture is hard to move. It is hard to move the ship and to make it stick. And I think that is the challenge for us as leaders as well as our airmen to really own this mission.

We have to empower our airmen. We have to trust them and we have to give them that sense of purpose so that they really do take the culture and make it theirs. And that is something that is going to take some time. It is going to take some effort, but I think we are on the right path.

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir. I agree with General Clark, you know, the first two items as I look at the NER recommendations really is the resource challenges, consistency of budget is extremely important.

That is the one piece and I won't—we have already talked about that. And then just like——

Mr. JOHNSON. Which did not lead to the morale problems.

General WEINSTEIN. No, it did not lead to the morale problems. But when you look at some of the—that is why to me, culture and I appreciated the question from Congressman Rogers that the culture piece is really important.

When you look at what the changes we made in the ICBM force, those changes are really geared in really two main areas. Area one has to do with improvements in the force. And I will talk about things that you can buy—new vehicles, cleaning capsules, making sure they have the right mattresses, making sure they have the right gear for security forces, make sure they have the right weapons and the right scopes.

The bigger issue to me that is the—where I am getting a lot of bang for the buck has to do with the changing of the culture. In the ICBM force, which really impacted the culture piece, was we didn't empower our young officers.

We took authority away from them. And when you take authority away from someone that wants to do a job, that is the worst thing for morale. By empowering our young airmen and our young officers to do the job, I think that is the most foundational thing that we are doing in order to improve the culture in the ICBM force.

So when you look at the challenges, the challenges are continuing that culture change by trusting our airmen, giving them the right resources, giving the right training, and then when you do that, and you trust them and then if they make a mistake, there are two types of mistakes people will make. You will make an error of omission or error of commission. If you make an error of omission, you handle that one way, an error of commission you handle another way.

So I think by really focusing on the culture changes is what is why if you were to visit one of my bases versus visiting them over a year ago, you would actually see a pep in people's step. You would see people that like the mission more, all because we are changing the culture by trusting them.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right.

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Admiral.

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, as I said, we are focused on two things—the infrastructure and personnel. So I would say that our greatest challenge right now is hiring and not just hiring but hiring and training personnel to do the mission of strategic deterrence whether it is in the shipyards, repairing the nuclear platforms, the submarines or whether it is in my strategic weapons facilities, hiring and training people to do the maintenance on the weapons and on the delivery system.

So we are on track with doing that. But that is a two-faced effort—one is to hire them, the second one is to train and certify them to do the mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Dr. Brumer.

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you, Congressman. Particular recommendations I think are mostly straightforward, you know, the resource challenges are real, the culture challenges are real. A lot of the rec-

ommendations come down to trying to strike a balance, a balance between empowering your airmen and ensuring adherence to rigorous standards, balances within culture.

Those are challenging. And the only way to achieve a balance, and it is one of the reasons I think that we have had difficulty in the past, we have gone too far one way, the reviews tell us to go the other way, and we go too far the other way, is sustained attention and recalibration over time and that is difficult.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman from Montana, Mr. Zinke.

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Getting back to when an incident occurs in a nuclear facility, the chain of command and whether to notify Congress or not. I assume the incident over cheating, was there an OPREP [operations report] that was released over it?

General WEINSTEIN. I would have to verify, but I would assume there is, sir.

Mr. ZINKE. And generally on the OPREP I will assume the addressees are Secretary of Defense.

General WEINSTEIN. For the Air Force we provide it to the Air Force Operation Center, we provide it to National Military Command Center as well as Strategic Command.

Mr. ZINKE. And then that would be—the chain of command would be ultimately the Commander in Chief, I would assume?

General WEINSTEIN. I am not sure at what level it gets to.

Mr. ZINKE. But as far as informing Congress, I would assume it would go up to the Secretary of the Air Force or Secretary of Defense and they would have the responsibility. And lastly, I recently visited Malmstrom and the morale is good, you know, I think the—went in the hunting season, I visited during the hunting season; the hunting season is, you know, makes morale go up.

But one of the issues was the Humvees because it was pointed out that you are out there, the weather in Montana during the winter is bad, the distances are long, and in my experience the Humvees are not the best of vehicles going across the roads of Montana in the winter.

Are you aware of the problem with the Humvees and are trying to look at different vehicles that would be better in the weather, because I understand they have a lot of accidents up there and safety is an issue?

General WEINSTEIN. Yes, we agree that the Humvee is not the best vehicle. While it provides armor, up in Montana as well as North Dakota and Wyoming, it is not the best vehicle for the roads.

We are working really closely with our major command—Air Force Global Strike Command, because we know that we need to provide the defenders, security force members with the proper vehicle for what they are doing.

And I even had a discussion this week with the director of logistics at Global Strike Command on this very topic to replace the Humvees. My goal would be to replace the Humvees across the fleet to a vehicle that is better suited for the environment.

You know, Humvees don't have anti-lock brakes which makes it problematic driving on the roads as well as we need a vehicle in

the missile field that can—when it idles at minus 40 below can keep the airmen warm. And the Humvee does not do that. So we are looking at what is the best alternative to replace the security force vehicles with vehicles that our airmen need.

Mr. ZINKE. Certainly, if Congress can be helpful and expedite in that, so we don't go through another winter, even if it is a short-term flexibility, you know? Just let us know and we would I am sure be glad to help them do whatever we can.

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ZINKE. And Madam Chairman, I yield back.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. Now the chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Curious, Admiral Benedict and General Weinstein, could you compare—you could compare and contrast for me the nuclear oversight between the Navy and Air Force? You talked about, Admiral Benedict, being a nuclear regulator. Do you all have a regulator, Admiral Weinstein?

General WEINSTEIN. No, sir. We have—Admiral Benedict brought that up at a stakeholders meeting we had with Admiral Haney, and the United States Air Force is looking at it. I can talk briefly about the way the United States Air Force does it.

On a roughly quarterly basis, we have something called the nuclear oversight board. That nuclear oversight board is chaired by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, with all the four-stars going into issues that are nuclear.

At a level below that, there is another organization that is chaired by the Air Force A–10, another position that the Air Force will be upgrading to a three-star position. That position goes through and reviews all the internal Air Force issues as well as issues that are going to be brought forward for the Nuclear Enterprise Review.

So bottom line is that senior levels of the United States Air Force chair a meeting as well as the Air Force A–10 chairs a meeting to look at items.

The other one—if I could say one more thing also. Internal to Air Force Global Strike Command we stood up something called the senior working group. That senior working group is—it is tri-chaired actually between the vice commander of Global Strike Command, myself, and General Clark.

And we go through periodically all the recommendations and as the operational commanders, we can put pressure on the force in order to make sure our airmen get redux, so there are about three different layers of oversight that we are providing the nuclear enterprise.

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, I think as you know with—I am the single accountable flag officer within the United States Navy. So on the acquisition side, I am the only direct reporting program manager on the acquisition aspects of the Strategic Weapons System and in that I report to Mr. Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

I am an Echelon II commander on the operational side and in that I am responsible for all the deployed assets. I report directly to the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]. I am also the project offi-

cer for the Polaris sales agreement and in that I am the one authorized to sell internationally to the United Kingdom. And then most recently the Secretary of the Navy has designated me the regulator for all nine Echelon IIs who have any role in supporting the Navy's nuclear deterrent mission.

So that allows me to integrate across all those functions and report directly to either the secretary for international, Mr. Stackley for acquisition, or directly for the CNO for any operational aspects.

All of that comes together with us on a—about an every 6-week meeting of what is the called the Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight Council which is chaired by the director of the Navy staff who reports directly to the CNO, and that group, which is all the N codes, all the three-stars within the OPNAV [Office of the CNO] staff, have total transparency into all aspects of the Navy's mission here.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Thank you. General Weinstein, we had a briefing, I think it was a week ago, Admiral Benedict was in that where General Harencak talked about the need for helicopters for security purposes.

We just found out the appropriators have cut those. What does that mean for you and your mission, your ability to do your mission?

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate the question. You know, the current helicopters that we use in the missile field are 1960, 1970 Hueys. They don't have based on the DOD [Department of Defense] requirements for payload lifting capacity and range.

So it is a—we know operationally, we need a new helicopter. We don't have a helicopter that can move the security forces at the speed we need to get to the missile field. So any delay in a new helicopter from an operational consideration is really damaging to the security we have of the weapon system.

Mr. ROGERS. General Clark, the B–52s, awesome, but you are right—they are really old. But you did testify a little earlier, you think they have got—or you all expect a life of 25 to 30 more years. Is that accurate?

General CLARK. Sir, that is accurate.

Mr. ROGERS. I talked with a new flag officer that we have got at Global Strike Command this week and told him about my interest in seeing a re-engining of the B–52s. And he explained to me the job leader General Wilson has been working on that.

What are your thoughts about the viability of re-engining the B–52s with these new modern fuel efficient engines?

General CLARK. Sir, my personal opinion is that it is critical. If we are going to fly this airplane for another 25 years, there is going to be a point that these engines will—they will need to be replaced, I believe.

It doesn't just impact us though from a business case, I mean it is fuel efficiency, as you mentioned. It is also maintainability; the maintenance on these engines is getting more expensive every year. Spare parts are becoming more scarce as we go, and they are only going to get—that situation is only going to get worse over the coming decades.

But there is also an operational case. If we put these new engines on, it increases our range. It increases our opportunity for loi-

ter capability. It increases the payload that the aircraft can carry, it increases the altitudes that it can climb to.

It does everything that—or it enhances everything that we need a bomber to do, really. So I think that this is something that we should take a serious look at and try and take action on.

Mr. ROGERS. We are. Thank you very much. Thank you, all, for your service.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you to each of you for coming today. Thank you for all my colleagues who are participating today. Clearly, there have been several challenges over the last few years that have been identified in our most important mission that we have for a strong nuclear deterrent in our country.

But I am encouraged by what we have heard today and encouraged by the systems that have been set up to make sure and monitor, Dr. Brumer, what is occurring and the recommendations, but also the positive steps and the leadership that is already being shown to address these issues and the improvements that we have already seen in a short amount of time.

So I am very encouraged and feel like we are on the right track and we will get there under your leadership with the support here of Members of Congress. We are committed to working with you on that. And I would be remiss before we close the hearing not to introduce the new commander of Whiteman Air Force Base, General Paul Tibbets who is there as well. Do you want to wave here?

And I have to say as far as the competition goes, you have talked about the Global Strike Challenge, I have to mention since—that we did win the Fairchild award, Trophy. And we did very well in that, so very, very proud of that. Thank you all for being here and this briefing is now closed.

[Whereupon, at 2:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JUNE 25, 2015

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 25, 2015

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

STATEMENT OF

DR. YISROEL BRUMER

DIRECTOR

STRATEGIC, DEFENSIVE, AND SPACE PROGRAMS

COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

25 JUNE 2015

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairwoman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to join you today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about how my team is executing the Secretary of Defense's direction to track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of recommendations from recent internal and external reviews of the Nuclear Enterprise and to support efforts to ensure the viability of our Nation's strategic deterrence in the 21st century.

In February 2014, former Secretary Hagel directed both internal and external reviews of the entire Nuclear Enterprise. These reviews were conducted over the course of several months by highly esteemed nuclear professionals. The review teams conducted hundreds of field interviews with individuals whose experiences spanned the Nuclear Enterprise, from first-term Airmen, Sailors, and Marines to the most senior commanders. Both reviews concluded that without intervention, issues related to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have the Nuclear Enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems than we have previously witnessed.

As you are aware, these were not the first studies detailing the shortfalls within the Nuclear Enterprise, and several had noted very similar findings. With that in mind, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Department must place a renewed emphasis on improving the health of the nuclear force.

To enhance senior leader visibility and ensure effective implementation that addresses root causes, Secretary Hagel directed the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), with the support of the Joint Staff, Air Force, Navy, OSD, and U.S. Strategic Command, to:

1) Track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of the reviews' recommendations.

2) Conduct analysis to determine if corrective actions are having the desired effect and yield long-term sustainable solutions.
3) Assess the health of the nuclear enterprise.
4) Provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
5) Provide quarterly updates to the Secretary of Defense.

My division within CAPE is charged with this task because our portfolio includes program assessment and evaluation of the Nuclear Enterprise.

In his tasking letter to CAPE, Secretary Hagel directed the Military Departments and other DoD Components to provide CAPE everything necessary to conduct robust, complete, rigorous, and timely assessments. We have been granted access to the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, and Service agencies to gather pertinent data to meet the Secretary's charge of robust, complete, rigorous, and timely assessment. Our team now includes current and former active duty military members with Air Force, Navy, and USSTRATCOM experience, as well as scientists and data experts to support technical assessments. Additionally, we utilize a contractor team to conduct deep dive data analyses and leverage subject matter expertise. The diversity of the team has provided a broad understanding of the reviews' recommendations so we can properly assess the wide range of subjects brought forward. I am extremely proud of the team, which has been willing to put in the intensity and the hours necessary to do the job right. They have shown unwavering dedication to improving the Nuclear Enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective analysis, data, and assessments possible.

BEYOND BOX CHECKING

Department of Defense senior leadership has been very clear that they are keenly interested in comprehensive and sustainable solutions, rather than short-term efforts that merely

meet recommendations by checking boxes without placing the enterprise on more solid footing. The Secretary charged our team to go beyond ensuring that tasks are completed and to answer questions like "Are DoD efforts having the intended effect?", "Are unanticipated risks arising?" and most critically, "Is the Nuclear Enterprise getting healthier?"

This charge has proven to be both the most important and most difficult aspect of our task. It is comparatively easy to verify that an instruction has been modified to relieve the nuclear force of an unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has been delivered to the force. It is much more difficult to measure changes in culture or personal attitudes toward the mission. For this reason, we added a social scientist to the team and have leveraged the expertise of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, which conducts surveys of the command climate in units across all the Services, to help us gather the pertinent data for accurate assessments of the overall health of the Nuclear Enterprise. Additionally, we remain vigilant to identify unintended second- and third-order effects of changes driven by the recommendations.

We have also initiated efforts to ensure that we are capable of independently verifying the accuracy of the reports we are receiving, without becoming another inspection agency that places an additional burden on the force. We are gathering a broad array of data and are creating relationships with key agencies to obtain on-the-ground data from existing inspections to support our assessments. Lastly, we plan to regularly interact with forces in the field at all ranks, on a non-attribution basis, to better understand the challenges they are facing and the changes they are seeing.

PROGRESS TO DATE

I am proud to report to this Committee that our team has made significant strides in a short time. Since September, we have combed every possible recommendation from the two reviews, nearly 200 in all. We held meetings with all stakeholders and formulated problem statements in an effort to identify the root cause of each issue. We worked with each responsible organization to develop detailed approaches to correct the root problems. Finally, metrics and milestones were developed to provide mechanisms for moving the various efforts forward and for assessing their effects. In keeping with the spirit of the task to go "beyond box checking," the team developed both process metrics to determine whether a particular task is completed, as well as outcome metrics to assess whether the cumulative effects of the tasks are achieving the desired intent of the recommendations and improving the overall health of the Enterprise.

In line with the Secretary's charge for complete, rigorous, and timely assessment, the CAPE Director and our team has visited and will continue to visit key Nuclear Enterprise locations. During these visits, the team becomes more familiar with the unique mission and quality-of-life challenges of that particular location. Additionally, the team holds individual and group non-attributional discussions to gather empirical data to determine what issues are most pressing to those individuals or groups, and solicits feedback on whether personnel in the field think our metrics are appropriate for tracking the health of the Enterprise.

As stated earlier, we recognize the outcome metrics will be the most challenging to assess. We also recognize these are the most challenging for those in the field to execute, and it will take years of dedicated efforts to restore the risk margin that has been lost. We intend to provide leadership with our best analysis and advice to help them guide these efforts to completion.

CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense leadership, from Secretary Carter on down, has been clear that the nuclear enterprise – and the deterrent effect it provides – is a high priority and will remain so as long as nuclear weapons exist. My team has embraced that challenge and they are proud to have been entrusted with the role of ensuring appropriate resourcing, personnel, organizational, and policy issues are addressed to provide the Nation with the safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is so critical to our national security. The CAPE team will continue to report our progress on a regular basis. You have our assurance that we will remain vigilant and will maintain our reputation for rigor, honesty, and integrity in this important mission.

Dr. Yisroel Brumer
Director, Strategic, Defensive, and Space Programs

SUMMARY: Yisroel Brumer holds a Masters in Chemistry and a Ph.D. in Chemical Physics from Harvard. After conducting postdoctoral research on the application of physics to complex biological systems, he joined the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate where he was a pioneering member of the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center and kicked off a technical reach-back program intended to provide support to first responders across the country. Dr. Brumer then joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), where he conducted analysis and provided advice on the DoD's Science and Technology, Homeland Defense, Nuclear Command and Control, and Combating WMD portfolios. After promotion to the Senior Executive Service, Dr. Brumer led the Program Analysis Division within CAPE, where he led major cross-cutting analyses and all DoD Front End Assessments, which were selected by and briefed out directly to the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Brumer currently leads the Strategic, Defensive, and Space Programs Division, providing advice and analysis on a program portfolio valued at over $60B per year ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles to antiterrorism. Dr. Brumer's writings have appeared in publications ranging from Nature Materials to Newsweek.

EDUCATION:
B.Sc., Chemistry, University of Toronto, 1999
M.Sc., Chemistry, Harvard University, 2001
Ph.D., Chemical Physics, Harvard University, 2003

EXPERIENCE:
2012-Present: Director, Strategic, Defensive, and Space Programs Division, OSD/CAPE
2010-2012: Director, Program Analysis Division, OSD/CAPE
2005-2010: Operations Research Analyst, Strategic, Defensive, and Space Programs Division, OSD/CAPE
2004-2005: AAAS Homeland Security Fellow, Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate
2003-2004: Postdoctoral Research Assistant, Harvard University

SELECTED HONORS, AWARDS, AND SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS:
Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service (w/ Bronze Palm), 2013
Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 2013
Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, 2010
SC4ISR High Impact Analysis Award, 2009
Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 2007
National Institutes of Health Postdoctoral Fellowship, 2004
National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1999-2002
Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University, 1999-2000
Robert Karplus Prize Fellowship in Chemical Physics, 1999-2000
Dr. James and Connie Dickson Scholarship in the Sciences and Mathematics, 1997
The Daniel Wilson Scholarship in Chemistry, 1997

(Current as of February 2015)

STATEMENT

OF

VICE ADMIRAL TERRY BENEDICT, USN

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

STATUS UPDATE ON THE RESOLUTION OF FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2014 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR

ENTERPRISE REVIEW

25 JUNE 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Introduction

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Navy's status of findings and recommendations from the 2014 Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise Review. It is an honor to testify before you this afternoon representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).

SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the TRIDENT II (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS). The men and women of SSP and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen who are standing the watch, ensuring the security of the weapons we are entrusted with by this nation.

The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the TRIDENT II (D5) SWS. The Navy's top priority is to maintain a credible, effective, and safe sea-based strategic deterrent. A number of factors have contributed to an increased reliance on the sea-based leg of the Triad. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reinforced the importance of SSBNs and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) they carry. SLBMs will comprise a significant majority of the nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads, thus increasing the nation's reliance on the sea-based leg of the nuclear Triad.

After a series of missteps involving the nation's nuclear forces and their senior leadership, Secretary Hagel directed both an internal Department of Defense review and an external, independent review of the DoD nuclear enterprise. These reviews included Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, nuclear capable bombers and tactical fighters, Navy Ballistic Missile Submarines and the weapons they carry, as well as the supporting infrastructure to build, maintain, and control these assets. These reviews now known as the Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) provided the Navy an unbiased look, and ultimately found the nuclear enterprise was and continues to be safe, secure, and effective

today. However, it found evidence of systemic problems that, if not addressed, could undermine the safety, security, and effectiveness of elements of the nuclear forces in the future.

Findings and Recommendations

The Secretary of Defense–directed the NER teams to examine the nuclear mission, specifically regarding personnel, training, testing, command oversight, mission performance, and investment. The results of the comprehensive review focused significant attention on the recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear deterrence systems and infrastructure. While many issues will need additional investments, in many cases the necessary corrective actions are cultural and structural. These measures will take time to implement, and must be sustained over the long term. The review provided a number of recommendations for both short and long-term actions; some were service specific, some were at the departmental level and others were germane to the entire enterprise. The NER teams made it clear that this essential mission requires refocused attention and resources at all levels of the Department.

The NER findings and recommendations were organized into the following categories: personnel, inspections, investment, and organization. The review of personnel issues identified concerns with accountability, manning and skills mix, career development, morale and recognition, the personnel reliability program, and security forces. Specific issues identified within the Navy were rapidly aging civilian workforces at the Navy Shipyards; undue stress on the Submarine crews created by Navy Shipyard shortfalls due to personnel constraints; as well as a significant gap of mid-career civilian personnel. The inspection related inquiry was concentrated on the culture of excessive inspections. The Navy in particular does not possess a culture of excessive inspections, rather the emphasis is placed squarely on meaningful self-assessment. In point of fact the Navy's internal Nuclear Weapons Assessment and the SSP Comprehensive Self-Assessment identified most of the issues underscored during the NER. In fact, the report validated numerous efforts already underway and identified corrective actions for issues that were already in progress.

In regards to investment, the NER focused on sustainment, operations and maintenance funding, and infrastructure issues. As expected, the review determined that as infrastructure continues to age, sustainment will become increasingly more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. More explicitly for the Navy this is exhibited by the use of obsolete or temporary facilities due to prolonged underinvestment. Finally, the report addressed the issue of organization of the nuclear forces and leadership. The findings echoed previous reports that identified a shortfall regarding the integrated chain of command, which is critical in a departmental-wide "nuclear enterprise". Ultimately, the reviews found a nuclear workforce that was dedicated, capable, and performing well despite the challenges that were identified. Today our nuclear weapons and weapons systems are safe and secure despite operating well beyond their originally designed life. However, this readiness cannot be sustained indefinitely.

Actions

The reviews of our DOD nuclear weapons enterprise have revealed that it no longer has the margin of safety and reliability it once had. Consequently, the nation faces a substantive, multi-decade recapitalization challenge in which we must continue to invest. Our current and planned investments are significant compared to past expenditures in our strategic deterrent programs since 1992 yet are not commensurate with the magnitude of the strategic deterrent mission which is not expected to markedly change for the foreseeable future. The Navy has taken active steps to address the more than 68 recommendations with Navy equity contained in the report.

Significant action has been taken to implement each recommendation, generally focused on a few key areas, including: oversight, investment, and personnel and training improvements. The Navy will continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to implement recommendations across the fleet to ensure safety and reliability. Navy has added an additional $468M in FY 2016. The Navy will stay engaged with additional focus in this area to ensure our investments continue to be relevant and effective.

With respect to oversight, the Navy is clarifying the nuclear deterrent enterprise leadership structure and reducing administrative burdens imposed on the forces. The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), formed and led by the Secretary of Defense will provide regular oversight of the nuclear enterprise. The Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission Oversight Council has become the Navy's mechanism to ensure NDERG recommendations and guidance are properly implemented and that investments achieve the intended effect. This consolidation of leadership and oversight will streamline the chain of command, ultimately decreasing the burden on the Department.

Regarding training and personnel the Navy is planning a significant investment to build acceptable margin in the deterrence force and clear the SSBN maintenance backlog. Some of the recommendations involve long-term cultural or organizational changes, and the Navy has matched the right responsibilities with the right leaders. There will be an emphasis on the importance of the deterrence mission through updated vision statements, revised campaign plans, and methods to eliminate obstacles to enhance moral conduct and relieve the pressures on Sailors, training, and work-life balance. More specifically the Navy will apply additional resources to Strategic Mission personnel with a planned increase of 60 Full Time Equivalents (FTE) in FY 2016. In addition 309 FTEs were added for the Strategic Weapons Facilities and TRIDENT Training Facility to improve sustainment and training of the ballistic missile submarine force.

The Navy has also begun a substantial increase in the workforce at the four Naval Shipyards to better match capacity with workload. The current hiring plan will result in a target of 33,500 direct and reimbursable FTEs. In addition, some submarine maintenance will be outsourced to the private sector to ensure over capacity work does not result in deferred maintenance. Both of these actions will be part of an investment of $338M for FY2016.

There will be accelerated infrastructure improvements and recapitalization plans to ensure long-term sustainment at Shipyards and Strategic Weapons Facilities. The Navy accelerated investment from a 17 year plan to a 15 year plan to improve the condition of the Shipyards by adding $42M in FY2016. The Navy has also funded

$20.7M to address infrastructure sustainment and recapitalization to ensure long term health at the critical Strategic Weapons Facilities. Navy is also developing a 20 year investment plan to guarantee the continued reliability of critical infrastructure at these facilities to support nuclear weapons movement and operations. While the Navy has made significant progress through actions taken to date, we recognize much work remains to be accomplished. The Navy is confident we have the right emphasis, oversight and processes in place to maintain a credible, modern, and safe sea-based deterrent.

The following table reflects individual programs increases associated with selected program areas for FY 2016 and represents the total additional program budgeted for NER actions in PB16 from the FY 2015 position in PB15:

NER Increased Funding	FY16 Increase ($M) (D/R)
Shipyard Funding Increase	338.4
Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay	9.5
SSP Headquarters	4.8
Strategic Weapon Facilities (Civilian)	5.2
Trident Training Facility Bangor, COMSUBRON TWENTY, COMPACFLT	1.8
Strategic Weapon Facilities (Military)	1.1
COMSUBGRU TEN, COMSUBLANT, COMSUBPAC	0.6
Missile Trainer, Trident Training Facility Bangor	12.0
Research and Development for TRIDENT Follow-on	0.0
SSP Operational Engineering Support	10.9
Nuclear Weapon Surety Training	0.0
Strategic Weapon Facility Infrastructure (ST)	17.7

Strategic Weapon Facility Infrastructure (RM)	3.0
Shipyard Infrastructure (Recap)	34.4
Shipyard Infrastructure (ST)	7.6
E-6B TACAMO Maintenance	21.4
Total	**468.4**

The following table shows the change in funding across the Nuclear Enterprise between FY 2015 and FY 2016. Increases/decreases in this table represent the net changes in selected program areas. In addition to specific increases identified by the NER, these values include other price and program adjustments for the FY 2015 and FY 2016 positions in the PB16 request:

Nuclear Enterprise Funding Breakdown	FY15* ($M)	FY16* ($M)
OHIO Class	1,083	1,173
Strategic Weapons System (SWS)	2,270	2,250
OHIO Replacement Program	1,248	1,391
Ship Maintenance (LI:1B4B)**	5,307	5,961
Shipyard Infrastructure (Recap)	174	181
Shipyard Infrastructure (ST)	74	129
Shipyard Infrastructure Support and Planning for Future Years	0	8
Strategic Weapons Facilities Infrastructure (Recap)	12	0
Strategic Weapons Facilities Infrastructure (ST)	24	34
Strategic Weapons Facilities Infrastructure Support and Planning for Future Years	0	3
Total	**10,192**	**11,130**
*PB16 President's Budget, Recap – Recapitalization, ST – Sustainment ** Includes entire ship maintenance account		

Navy Nuclear Regulatory Responsibility

As a result of the organizational concerns identified in the Nuclear Enterprise Review the Navy implemented a centralized regulatory authority for nuclear force readiness. As the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP), I now have accountability, responsibility and authority to serve as the single Flag Officer to monitor performance and conduct end-to-end assessment of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM) elements. These responsibilities are defined in SECNAVINST 8120.1B and OPNAVINST 8120.1. Nine Echelon 2 level commands directly contribute to the NNDM: US Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM), US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Fleet Cyber Command (USFLTCYBERCOM), Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM), Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), and SSP.

DIRSSP is the NNDM regulatory authority responsible for assessing and reporting issues to the Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission Oversight Council and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). SSP is tasked with developing, coordinating, and implementing policies approved by the CNO, and conducting end-to-end assessments of the Department of the Navy nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems and personnel for safe, reliable, and effective execution of the NNDM.

SSP is engaged with the Echelon 2 commands defined above to understand their current reporting and assessment processes and to define the NNDM regulatory assessment policy. CNO holds me accountable to define the existing reporting and engagement strategies, understand the status of my interaction with the commands, and to present my assessment of the enterprise on a continuing basis.

Conclusion

If we fail to sustain these investments we risk degrading the global stabilizing effect of a diverse, strong, and capable nuclear force. It is imperative we resource future sensor improvements; upgrades for nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities; strategic delivery system recapitalization efforts; weapon life-extension programs and stockpile surveillance activities; and nuclear complex infrastructure modernization. Together these exceptionally important and necessary investments will ensure our triad of nuclear forces remains viable and credible not only to our own defense but to our allies defense as well.

Navy continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent and focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy. However, we must remain vigilant about unforeseen age-related issues to ensure the high reliability required of our SWS. Navy must maintain the engineering support and critical skills of our industry and government team to address any future challenges with the current system as well as prepare for the future of the program. Our nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical component of our national security since the 1950s and must continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries well into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation.

Vice Admiral Terry J. Benedict
Director, Strategic Systems Programs

Vice Admiral Benedict graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1982 with a Bachelor of Science Degree. He also holds a Master of Science in Engineering Science from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Phoenix. He is a graduate of the Advanced Program Management course at the Defense Acquisition University, the Executive Leadership Course at Carnegie Mellon and is a certified PMP. Vice Admiral Benedict's first assignment after graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy was to USS Harry E. Yarnell (CG-17). He transferred to the Engineering Duty Officer community in 1985. Vice Admiral Benedict reported to Strategic Systems Programs in 1988.

His engineering duty officer tours include: Software Manager for the Navigation Branch, Strategic Systems Programs, responsible for D5 IOC navigation software development, test and implementation, 1988-1990; Assistant for missile engineering budget and contract incentives, 1990-1991; Assistant for Arms Control to the Director, Strategic Systems Programs, responsible for all aspects of implementation and compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), including the Navy's coordinator for the initial Russian visit to the U.S. for the required START missile and telemetry technical exhibitions and temporary assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for START negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, 1991-1993; Technical Division Director at the Program Management Office, Strategic Systems Programs, Sunnyvale, CA, responsible for all in-factory development, production and operational support of the Navy's TRIDENT I and II missile systems, 1993-1996; Engineering Section Head in the Missile Branch, Strategic Systems Programs, responsible for all aspects of the Missile Branch's research, development, repair, instrumentation, flight test support and operational support of the TRIDENT I and II missile systems for both the U.S. and UK programs, 1996-1998; Naval Sea Systems Command as a Systems Engineer in the Warfare Architecture Directorate, responsible for initial development of the Navy's "System-of-Systems" engineering process, the development and integration of the Navy's Battle Force Design Reference Missions, development of Battle Force metrics and the Navy's Distributed Engineering Plant, 1998-2000; Strategic Systems Programs as the TRIDENT II Guidance and Fire Control Branch Head including the development of the design requirements for the Navy's SSGN Fire Control system, 2000-2002; Executive Assistant to the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, 2002-2003. Vice Admiral Benedict was assigned as Technical Director, Strategic Systems Programs in January 2004-July 2007.

Vice Admiral Benedict's first flag assignment was as Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), Washington, D.C.

Vice Admiral Benedict assumed command as the 13th Director of the Strategic Systems Programs on 7 May 2010.

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Status Update on Resolution of the Findings and Recommendations of the 2014 Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise Review

STATEMENT OF: Major General Jack Weinstein, Commander
Twentieth Air Force

June 25, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Introduction

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members of the Committee; thank you for allowing me to appear before you and represent the over 10,000 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) professionals of Twentieth Air Force.

Strategic Importance

The Nation's ICBM force provides a credible, around-the-clock nuclear deterrent, poised and ready if called upon by the President to conduct rapid, accurate and decisive global strike. Every day, over 900 Airmen deploy to launch facilities and missile alert facilities across a 33,600 square mile area of responsibility in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming to operate, secure, sustain and support 450 Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBMs. The responsive nature of ICBMs, in concert with the survivable nature of our ballistic missile submarines and the flexibility and visibility of our nuclear capable bombers, provides the President with a safe, secure and effective nuclear force vital to strategic deterrence in the 21st century.

Overview of Nuclear Enterprise Studies

In the first half of 2014, following a series of missteps in the nuclear enterprise, the Department of Defense and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) conducted several studies to identify problems and provide recommendations for improvement. I am particularly grateful to Secretary James, General Welsh, and my boss, AFGSC commander Lieutenant General Stephen Wilson, for allocating $160 million during FY14 and $150 million in FY15 to address the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER). With these funds, the Air Force addressed numerous shortfalls to include critical spare parts for ICBM infrastructure, new vehicles suitable for our operating environment, funding over 700 billets to relieve manning shortfalls and procuring Operational Camouflage Pattern uniforms to provide a tactical advantage for our nuclear security professionals. To relieve administrative burdens on the force, we restored the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) as a commander's program to ensure Airmen are fit for nuclear duty. This spring, AFGSC established a Leadership Development Center (LDC) to develop Airmen at all levels as nuclear leaders and professionals. This is not an all-inclusive list but clearly represents the Air Force's focus that the nuclear mission is the number one priority.

Actions To Date

As the commander of the operational ICBM force, my focus has been and continues to be rebuilding culture and improving morale as identified in the NER. As many of you know, culture change is difficult, non-linear and takes time. So over the past 18 months I've consistently reinforced the steps we must take to improve.

Beginning last spring, I released ten Leadership Vector memorandums to immediately address, among other topics, the need to empower Airmen at all levels and instill a culture of respect and critical self-assessment. Also, I hosted two symposiums with senior officer and enlisted leaders from all three missile wings to mentor them and define our future actions.

In January 2015, we published the Task Force 214 and Twentieth Air Force Strategic Narrative to further set the tone for rebuilding the ICBM culture and provide an enduring guidepost for continued improvements in the ICBM mission. I continue to remind my commanders that all of our efforts must reflect back on and uphold the ideals in the narrative. My staff is currently developing a comprehensive Campaign Plan that will define our milestones in the coming years to achieve the ideals outlined in the Strategic Narrative.

We modified several operational processes to put into practice these culture change ideals. First, we implemented a "3+3" operational tour construct for our missile operators. These officers now serve their first three-year assignment focusing on developing their weapon system proficiency. After this initial tour, the majority will transfer to another missile wing where they will assume greater responsibility and leadership as instructors, evaluators and/or flight commanders.

We also reorganized our training and evaluation programs to eliminate the blurred lines between the two. Practical application in our simulator is now our main instrument of training, not written tests. Further, we placed instructors in the squadron which has led to more robust individually focused training of missile officers.

More robust training has enabled us to place authority and responsibility back into the hands of those who perform the mission every day. By providing the proper tools and empowering our Airmen to make decisions, we are developing our Airmen not just as technical experts but as leaders.

Throughout our ICBM wings, group and wing commanders are "leading from the front" by requalifying in the weapon system and standing alert alongside their junior Airmen, serving as an example while coaching, training and mentoring them in the operational environment.

While AFGSC is standing up the LDC for professional development, we increased the number of ICBM specific courses at our own ICBM Center of Excellence. This training provides all of our Airmen with increased weapon system knowledge and detailed instruction on how to train and evaluate. Additionally, we have connected with our nuclear mission partners to give our Airmen the opportunity to visit national command centers, Department of Energy facilities, maintenance depots and witness firsthand MMIII test launches to broaden their professional development.

In March, we activated the 582d Helicopter Group. The unit not only provides an aviation-focused chain of command to three helicopter squadrons and an operations support squadron, but adds a senior leadership position for aspiring ICBM-savvy aviators. Having an experienced nuclear aviator, alongside our ICBM operations, maintenance and security forces group commanders, advising and providing technical expertise on helicopter operations substantially enhances our ability to execute the ICBM mission as an integrated team.

Finally, we are implementing the Deputy Secretary of Defense's decision to use revised security forces guidance to meet the requirements of a personnel reliability assurance program in lieu of PRP for our Defenders. This action provides a wider range of career opportunities for our security forces Airmen without compromising nuclear security or reducing the standards already in place.

Conclusion

As we fully implement resource and programmatic improvements to the ICBM mission, we will continue to rebuild the ICBM culture that is vital to continuing and enduring improvement. We will continue to listen to our front line Airmen for their feedback on what we have done and what else we can do to improve the ICBM mission. We're deeply committed to becoming a more operationally-focused force and a learning organization that values and respects the contributions of Airmen across the mission.

Major General Jack Weinstein
Commander, Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, and Commander, Task Force 214, U.S. Strategic Command

Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein is Commander, Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, and Commander, Task Force 214, U.S. Strategic Command, Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. General Weinstein is responsible for the nation's intercontinental ballistic missile force, organized into three operational wings with more than 9,600 people.

General Weinstein was commissioned through the ROTC program in 1982 and received distinguished graduate honors. He has served as a Minuteman missile combat crew commander, instructor, evaluator, flight commander, emergency war order instructor and as executive officer to the Commander, 20th Air Force. He also served on the Headquarters Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command staffs. He has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels. In 2005, he deployed to Southwest Asia as Director of Space Forces for operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. General Weinstein has also served as the Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Prior to his current assignment, he was Vice Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, La. He was responsible for assisting the commander in organizing, training and equipping Air Force Global Strike Command units for Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, B-2 and B-52 aircraft operations.

EDUCATION
1982 Bachelor of Science degree in criminal justice, University of Lowell, Mass.
1987 Master of Science degree in aviation management, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
1987 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1995 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1999 Master of Science degree in National Resource Strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2006 Senior Executive Fellowship, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS
1. November 1982 - March 1983, student, Minuteman III - command data buffer initial qualification training, 4315th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
2. April 1983 - August 1988, Minuteman III - command data buffer instructor, deputy missile combat crew commander, missile combat crew commander, Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile flight commander, standardization/ evaluation missile combat crew commander and wing emergency war order training officer, 321st Missile Wing, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
3. September 1988 - May 1991, ICBM test staff officer and Chief, ICBM Test Operations Training, 1st Strategic Aerospace Division, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
4. June 1991 - May 1992, executive officer, 20th Air Force, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
5. June 1992 - June 1993, ICBM operations staff officer, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
6. July 1993 - July 1994, ICBM operations staff officer, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
7. August 1994 - June 1995, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
8. July 1995 - May 1997, ICBM requirements officer and Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
9. June 1997 - July 1998, operations officer, 12th Space Warning Squadron, Thule Air Base, Greenland
10. August 1998 - June 1999, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. July 1999 - July 2001, Commander, 2nd Space Warning Squadron, Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colo.
12. July 2001 - May 2003, senior controller, and Chief, Information Operations Division (J39), USSTRATCOM, Offutt AFB, Neb.
13. May 2003 - June 2005, Commander, 90th Operations Group, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo.
14. June 2005 - March 2007, Commander, 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
15. March 2007 - August 2009, Director of Plans, Programs and Analyses, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

16. August 2009 - July 2011, Deputy Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
17. July 2011 - April 2012, Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. April 2012 - May 2013, Director of Air, Space and Cyberspace Operations, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
19. June 2013 - October 2013, Vice Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, La.
20. October 2013 – present, Commander, 20th Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, and Commander, Task Force 214, U.S. Strategic Command, Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyo.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. July 1995 - May 1997, ICBM requirements officer and Deputy Chief of Staff, USSTRATCOM, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major
2. July 2001 - May 2003, USCINCSTRAT senior controller, and Chief, Information Operations Division (J39), USSTRATCOM, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a lieutenant colonel and colonel

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION
Badges:
Master Space Professional Badge
Master Missile Operations Badge
Space Systems:
Minuteman III ICBM
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar
Defense Support Program Continental U.S. Ground Station; Space Based Missile Warning System
Space-Based Infrared System
Spacelift Commander

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Military Outstanding Volunteer Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Aug. 28, 1982
First Lieutenant Aug. 28, 1984
Captain Aug. 28, 1986
Major March 1, 1994
Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1998
Colonel July 1, 2002
Brigadier General June 20, 2008
Major General Sept. 9, 2011

(Current as of December 2013)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Status of Eighth Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Improvements and Strategic Systems

STATEMENT OF: Major General Richard M. Clark, Commander
Eighth Air Force

June 25, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Introduction

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to represent the over 12,000 men and women of the Eighth Air Force. I will use this opportunity to update you on our mission, our actions as a result of the Nuclear Enterprise Review, and the status of our forces.

Eighth Air Force Mission

The Mighty Eighth Air Force serves as the steward for our nation's B-52H Stratofortress (B-52) and B-2A Spirit (B-2) bombers. This includes maintaining the operational readiness of both the bombers' nuclear and conventional missions. The B-52 serves as the Eighth Air Force's most versatile and diverse weapon system by providing precision and timely long range strike capabilities. Meanwhile, the B-2 can penetrate our adversaries' most advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems to strike heavily defended targets. We look forward to incorporating the B-1 Lancer into Eighth Air Force later this year. This move will bring all of our long-range strike bombers under a single command.

It is our mission to safeguard America's interests through strategic deterrence and global strike on demand. For us to be effective across the spectrum of conflict from deterrence operations, to conventional strike, to full nuclear engagement, our Airmen must be ready and equipped with the right tools to do the job.

Nuclear Mission

Our flexible dual-capable bomber fleet is the most visible leg of the nuclear triad. We provide decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through

generation, dispersal, or deployment, and the ability to quickly place bomber sorties on alert thereby ensuring their continued survival in support of the President.

Conventional Mission

The Eighth Air Force focus on nuclear operations must not come at the cost of our conventional mission. Our conventional bomber forces defend our national interests by deterring or, should deterrence fail, defeating an adversary. Through the Bomber Assurance and Deterrence (BAAD) mission, we exercise with every combatant command and every joint partner annually. These exercises take place all over the world and are an example of the versatility that B-2 and B-52 bombers provide in the conventional mission arena. Two capabilities are fundamental to the success of our bomber forces: our ability to hold heavily defended targets at risk and our ability to apply persistent combat power across the spectrum of conflict anywhere on the globe at any time. Our bombers carry our latest high-tech munitions in sufficient quantities to ensure the Air Force can meet our nation's global responsibilities.

Nuclear Enterprise Review

This past November, DOD released two reports that analyzed the nuclear mission for areas of concern and improvement. The internal and external reports were extremely thorough, and I thank all those involved in helping make our nuclear forces better. The reports' findings reiterated many of our existing internal Force Improvement Program (FIP) recommendations. As a result of these investigations we have taken several steps, and in many cases fully implemented, force improvement and quality of life measures. There was a common thread throughout the last year with regard to the nuclear enterprise – senior leader

support. We neglected our nuclear forces for decades; our current leadership recognized this fact and moved decisively to correct the shortcoming. We look forward to continuing along the path of improvement and instilling it as a core philosophy in the nuclear enterprise.

Manning

With support from Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and the Secretary of the Air Force, we funded an additional 156 positions across our 3 bomber bases to provide relief to our most understaffed specialties.

We are looking at our Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) program at Andersen AFB, Guam to ensure we are manning the mission appropriately while providing much-needed stability for our Airmen. We have improved the quality of CBP lodging by repairing existing quarters, designating additional housing units for deployed members, and instituting a mold control program. Additionally, later this year, we will stand up a 34-person permanent party operations and maintenance detachment to provide continuity during rotations of our deployed personnel.

Training

This spring we started our first B-52 initial qualification class under a new training syllabus. The new syllabus is designed to ensure quality nuclear training without losing focus on the conventional mission. We are promoting unit cohesiveness by bringing our different crew positions together for academic training before beginning the flight phase of training. Then, on the flight line, the crews will receive much more one-on-one training than in previous syllabi. The end result is a better trained combat aviator in a shorter amount of time and improved squadron morale.

Career Progression

We are developing a force of leaders who understand nuclear strategy and policy, and are capable of thoughtfully articulating what deterrence means in the 21st century. We are utilizing expertise both within the Air Force and in industry to develop Airmen with the skills and knowledge necessary lead and shape deterrence theory and policy. AFGSC and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) teamed up to provide a new masters-level developmental education course for nuclear officers. The inaugural class starts in August 2015 and the graduates will integrate back into the nuclear community in summer 2016.

Eighth Air Force Status of Forces

B-52H

The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American airpower; its contributions to our national security through the Cold War, Vietnam War, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom are well documented. The B-52 has been the stalwart of American strategic airpower for over 50 years, but over the last 2 decades has been erroneously treated as a "sunset" platform and has not competed well for needed upgrades. The B-52 is forecast to remain a key element of our nuclear triad until 2040; we must invest resources into this aircraft now to keep it viable in both conventional and nuclear mission areas for the next 25 years. A new radar as well as more modern and fuel efficient engines are essential to maintaining the B-52's continued combat capability. We are currently in the study phase for a B-52 radar modernization program and have placed a high priority on new engines that will greatly improve the B-52's operational capability and pay us back in fuel savings and reduced maintenance costs after the initial investment. These two programs are absolutely necessary to keep the B-52 a combat ready deterrence tool for the nation.

B-2A

For over 20 years, the B-2 has defended America as our most modern strategic deterrent. In each of our nation's last four armed conflicts, the B-2 has led the way. We will preserve and improve the B-2's capability to penetrate hostile airspace and hold any target at risk without subjecting the crew and aircraft to undetected threats. To do this, we secured Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validation of the Defensive Management System-Modernization (DMS-M) capabilities development document, which will allow the program to enter into the engineering and manufacturing phase. This upgrade provides the B-2 aircrew with improved threat awareness and increased survivability by replacing the current DMS with modernized and sustainable systems capable of addressing advanced threats, which will keep the B-2 viable in future anti-access environments. We also continue to work on the Common Very Low Frequency Receiver to permit aircrews to better receive strategic communication messages, as well as the B-2 Flexible Strike program that will allow future weapon capability upgrades.

B-2 conventional combat capability continues to evolve by fielding vital programs such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) weapon. Successful fielding of the 30,000-pound MOP bolstered our nation's ability to hold hardened, deeply buried targets at risk. Flight testing of the MOP was successful, and our aircrew have begun training and exercising with this new capability. I would like to thank Congress for your support of this critical program.

We are striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet sustainment efforts, testing, aircrew training, and combat readiness. The dynamics of a small fleet continue to challenge our sustainment efforts primarily due to vanishing vendors

and diminishing sources of supply. Air Force Materiel Command is working to ensure timely parts availability; however, many manufacturers do not see a strong business case in supplying parts for a small aircraft fleet. Shortages of a single part can have a tremendous readiness impact on a small fleet that lacks the flexibility of a large force to absorb parts shortages and logistics delays.

Long Range Strike Bomber

The combat edge our B-2 provides will be challenged by next generation air defenses and the proliferation of these advanced systems. The Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program will extend American air dominance against next generation capabilities and advanced air defense environments. We continue to work closely with partners throughout the Air Force to develop the LRS-B and field a fleet of new dual-capable bombers; scheduled to become operational in the mid-2020s. We request your support for this essential program to ensure we maintain the ability to hold any target on the globe at risk. It is imperative that this bomber be purchased in sufficient quantities to provide persistent combat power where needed as well as to guarantee an adequate parts supply throughout the aircraft life cycle.

Air Launched Cruise Missile

The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground, winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. It was fielded in the 1980s and is well beyond its originally designed 10-year service life. To ensure the B-52 remains a credible part of the triad, the ALCM requires Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). These SLEPs need ongoing support and attention to ensure the ALCM will remain viable through 2030. Despite its age, last year we successfully conducted six flight test evaluations, and we plan seven this year to fully comply with USSTRATCOM directives.

Long Range Stand-Off Missile

The Long Range Stand-Off Missile (LRSO) is the replacement for the aging ALCM, which will have significant capability gaps beginning late this decade and worsening through the next. Replacement of the ALCM was identified by OSD in a 2007 Program Decision Memorandum and thrice reiterated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Airborne Strategic Deterrence Capability Based Assessment, and the Initial Capability Document. The LRSO is necessary to ensure we maintain a credible deterrent with the ability to strike at targets from beyond contested airspace in anti-access and area denial environments. The LRSO will be compatible with the B-52, B-2, and the LRS-B platforms. The LRSO Analysis of Alternatives is complete and JROC approved, and in February of last year the Air Force Chief of Staff signed the draft capabilities development document. LRSO was selected by SAF/AQ as a pilot program for "Bending the Cost Curve" and "Owning the Technical Baseline," which are new acquisition initiatives and is currently planned for reaching Milestone A next fiscal year. We fully intend to develop a conventional variant of the LRSO in the future.

B61-12

The B61-12 life extension program will result in a smaller stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the inventory, and improved nuclear surety. The B61-12 is needed for Eighth Air Force strategic bombers to meet USSTRATCOM requirements. The guidance system will allow for much greater weapon accuracy and, subsequently, reduced collateral damage. The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 1 and is synchronized with National Nuclear Security Administration efforts. The design and production processes are on schedule and within budget to meet the planned Fiscal Year 2020 First Production Unit date.

Conclusion

Your Eighth Air Force Airmen stand ready to execute their nuclear and conventional missions at a moment's notice. The state of our world does not allow for a grace period nor permit any delay in our forceful response. We know our adversaries will continue to modernize their own capabilities, and we also know that however we choose to mitigate these risks, fiscal headwinds will shape and influence our modernization decisions. The B-2, B-52, their weapons, and their capabilities won't last forever; it is imperative we prioritize our nuclear mission and the Airmen who execute it to ensure it remains our number one deterrent to adversary aggression.

Major General Richard M. Clark
Commander, Eighth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), and Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command

Maj. Gen. Richard M. Clark is the Commander, Eighth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and Commander Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. "The Mighty Eighth" serves as the air component headquarters to USSTRATCOM for strategic deterrence, global strike, and operates USSTRATCOM's Joint Air Operations Center. The Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike plans and executes strategic deterrence and global strike operations for USSTRATCOM. General Clark also commands Task Force 204 which oversees the Air Force nuclear bomber and reconnaissance activities in support of USSTRATCOM.

General Clark graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1986. His commands include the 34th Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas. He has also served as the Vice Commander, 8th Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Commandant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Prior to his current assignment, he served as Vice Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command.

General Clark is a command pilot with 4,200 flight hours, primarily in the B-1 bomber.

EDUCATION
1986 Bachelor of Science degree in management, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1991 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1994 Master of Arts degree in human resource development, Webster University, St. Louis, Mo.
1996 U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
1998 Master of Strategic Studies degree, Naval Command and Staff College, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
1999 Master of Airpower Studies degree, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2005 Master of National Security Studies degree, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS
1. May 1986 - February 1987, junior varsity football coach and candidate counselor, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
2. February 1987 - February 1988, student, undergraduate pilot training, Laughlin AFB, Texas
3. February 1988 - November 1991, EC-135 pilot, 2nd Airborne Command and Control Squadron, Offutt AFB, Neb.
4. November 1991 - November 1994, B-1 pilot, 28th Bomb Squadron, McConnell AFB, Kan.
5. November 1994 - July 1997, B-1 instructor pilot, B-1 Flight Training Unit, 28th Bomb Squadron, Dyess AFB, Texas
6. July 1997 - June 1998, student, Naval Command and Staff College, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
7. June 1998 - June 1999, student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
8. June 1999 - August 2000, action officer, Air Force Office of Legislative Liaison, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
9. August 2000 - August 2001, Fellow, President's Commission on White House Fellowships, Washington, D.C.
10. August 2001 - May 2002, assistant Director of Operations, 77th Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
11. May 2002 - May 2004, Commander, 34th Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
12. May 2004 - June 2005, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
13. June 2005 - January 2006, Vice Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas
14. January 2006 - June 2009, Commander, 12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, Texas
15. April 2008 - April 2009, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force - Iraq, Multi-National Force - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq
16. May 2009 - July 2010, Vice Commander, 8th Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Barksdale AFB, La.
17. July 2010 - August 2012, Commandant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
18. August 2012 - August 2014, Senior U.S. Defense Official; Chief, Office of Military Cooperation; and Defense Attaché, Cairo, U.S. Central Command, Cairo, Egypt.
19. August 2014 - April 2015, Vice Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, La.
20. April 2015 - present, Commander, Eighth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Barksdale AFB, La., and Joint Functional Component Commander for Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. April 2008 - April 2009, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force - Iraq, Multi-National Force - Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, as a brigadier general
2. August 2012 - August 2014, Senior U.S. Defense Official; Chief, Office of Military Cooperation; and Defense Attaché, Cairo, U.S. Central Command, Cairo, Egypt, as a brigadier general and major general
3. April 2015 - present, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: command pilot
Flight hours: 4,200
Aircraft flown: B-1, EC-135, KC-135, T-1, T-38 and T-6

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Flying Cross
Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Combat Action Medal
Nuclear Deterrence Operations Service Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 28, 1986
First Lieutenant May 28, 1988
Captain May 28, 1990
Major Sept 1, 1997
Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 2000
Colonel Aug. 1, 2004
Brigadier General Nov. 18, 2009
Major General June 4, 2013

(Current as of April 2015)

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 25, 2015

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

ICBM/nuclear bomber/SSBN personnel TDYs to educate triad on role and value of mission
Update USAF screensaver to include key turn and launch sequence
Update USAF web pages to accurately reflect career field split
Include 13N Patch in Red Flag Exercises
Fund TDYs to recruit and educate others on our "Nuclear Story" of the ICBM mission*
AFGSC A5/8/9 produce MMIII brief to educate crews on WS sustainment plan
Branding and re-image marketing campaign. Speaking goodwill at OTS, ROTC and USAFA to get the Air Force right so officers assigned to ICBMs are on the "right foot" before they arrive*
HQ and DT will have to place the right people into value creating strategic billets at commissioning sources, such as Instructor duty in the Department of Management, and USAFA
There needs to be more training/education on deterrence theory/assurance; give a sense of purpose; help build an intrinsic motivation
Expand CMR positions to include all missileers within the Ogs and 20 AF/A3N. Every qualified missileer in the OG, from the group commander down, should perform alert tours and be proficient in missile field duties
Every CMR missileer should participate in the same training and testing
Institutionalize SCP and ACP roles and responsibilities and provide comprehensive training to ensure SCP and ACP crews are prepared and competent*
Focus junior crews on alert crew proficiency by eliminating deputy crew commander instructor and evaluator positions
Formalize mandatory eligibility criteria for crew commander, instructor, evaluator positions based on alert tours and/or months of service in alert duties
Extend crew pairings so that crew commanders can develop and execute long-term training plans and monitor their deputy crew commander's training

Establish 3-year initial crew tour with upgrade to MCCC, SCP, assistant flight commander, and squadron instructor
Establish a second crew tour with upgrade to instructor, evaluator, and flight commander, followed by wing staff. PCS to another missile wing should be an option*
Retain K or Q prefix after second tour
Remove integral crew alert rate requirement and metric
Bolster arrival process for new crew members to ensure a deliberate socialization process
Establish 3-year initial line crew tour that does not present pressure to upgrade to instructor or evaluator as a DMCCC, and focuses on upgrade to MCCC*
Create stability in crew pairings to allow MCCCs to develop training expectations for their DMCCCs*
Establish a second crew tour with upgrade to instructor, evaluator, and flight commander. PCS to another missile wing should be an option*
Establish minimum number of alerts for upgrades to SCP, MCCC, instructor and evaluator
Celebrate alert tour milestones with patches and ceremonies at intervals of 100 alert tours*
Conduct periodic competitions between 20 AF missile wings. Emphasize crew performance and teamwork
Provide 13N incentive pay comparable to flight pay based on alert gates. Pay <2 year $125, 2-3 $188, 4-6 $206, 6-14 $650, 14-22 $840, 22-23 $585 (per month)
Grant alert duty credit for deployment (1 alert equals 1 deployment day)
Fund TDYs to recruit and educate others on our "Nuclear Story" of the ICBM mission*
Explore making 13N rated ops
Reinstate Minuteman Education Program
Provide an ACSC distant masters degree in leadership with nuclear concentration
Reinstate the ICBM "Blue Bag"

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Provide a gold missile badge, ribbon, and/or medal after completion of minimum number of alerts*
AFGSC should produce a Minuteman III briefing to educate crew members on the weapon system sustainment plan*
Create patches/rockers that highlight alert count, senior crew, instructor, evaluator, crew commander, etc
Send crew members TDY to bomber/SSBN/nuclear centers to understand value and role of triad and nuclear mission*
Create USAF ICBM screensaver to include key turn and launch sequence*
Include 13N weapons officers in Red Flag exercises*
Update USAF websites to recognize 13N/13S split*
Use the "senior" missile crew badge or another badge to signify crew commander qualification
Link missile badge "senior" and "master" designations to number of alerts pulled*
Identify number of alerts performed on OPR/SURF
Make all inspections pass/fail
Only grade areas as defined by AFGSC A3 & SE as critical to Nuclear Surety
Passing is meeting the standard/spirit & intent in day-to-day ops*
An individual mistake should not fail the wing if the process being inspected is good*
Allow for evaluator/inspector discretion on an error. If an individual makes a mistake, present the scenario again to allow for proper task demonstration
One inspection per calendar year
Only inspection testable item is Nuclear Surety*
Place focus on day-to-day mission: Positive Control Document inventory, Pre-Departure & Mission Planning, Field Operations*
Stop treating every error like Nuclear Surety and debrief the MPT errors in Patch; utilize the event as a training tool; document in members IQF
Remove requirement to outbrief Q-3 to OG/CC in service dress

Validate any operational impact before assessing any error; allow for evaluator discretion on an error
Minimum of one evaluation annually in the field or in the MPT. Any evaluation, to include HHQs, will reset proficiency date
With the exception of a HHQs Inspection, a crew member will not take more than 3 proficiency evaluations in one calendar year*
Proficiency evaluations will be similar to NSI style in content
Delink evaluations from the NAF standardized training plan and allow unit OGVs to develop evaluations that meet both Vol 2 and unit requirements*
NAF rescinds Annual Training and Evaluation Plan (ATEP) to allow units to shape their individual training plans while still meeting annual HHQ requirements
Evaluations should provide individuals a detailed analysis of strengths and weaknesses*
Focus operations inspections on MPTs and field performance; reduce the "cost" of less than perfect performance on inspections
Ensure evaluation performance standards are at the mission requirement level and not artificially inflated creating "tricky" test or evaluation scenarios*
Support squadron commanders by implementing a classic Air Force squadron structure in operational missile squadrons. Provide more mid-level leadership by retaining more experienced crew members for multiple combat crew tours and assigning them as ADOs
Change code 55 to three years for a crew tour*
Designate OSS, OGV, flight CC and senior crew as 2nd assignment duties following crew tour; K/Q becomes permanent part of officer's record after this assignment*
Conduct goodwill tours at commissioning sources*
Select strong junior leaders to attend AFSC fairs*
Establish standard "bill" for candidate AFSCs for each assignment cycle that are set aside for graduating missileers*

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Clearly state desired/valued attributes of crew members, instructors, evaluators, staff members, and leaders*
Close rank gap that currently exists between crew members and squadron commanders/operations officers with assistant operations officers and weapons officers
Clearly define roles and responsibilities of wing commanders, group commanders, squadron commanders, operations officers, assistant operations officers, flight commanders, and weapons officers*
Flight commanders should be required to observe their crew members at least once per quarter
ACP/SCP crews should provide a debrief of each alerts squadron activities to leadership
Add two field grade assistant operations officers to each tactical missile squadron*
Establish second crew tour for flight commanders*
Enhance squadron and flight commanders' roles in directing squadron mission planning and operations*
AFGSC reemphasize clear authority & responsibilities expectations*
AFGSC define roles and responsibilities for WG/CC, OG/CC, SQ/CC, SQ/DO, SQ/ADO, Flt/CCs*
Expand MSOT (provide additional MPT rides and end of course evaluation) which is not waiverable
AFGSC define roles and responsibilities for WG/CC, OG/CC, SQ/CC, SQ/DO, SQ/ADO, Flt/CCs*
OG/CC or higher observe all squadron commander evaluations
Squadron commanders will be ACP/SCP certified and pull alerts with CMR DMCCCs
Fix maintenance issues, especially crew irritant items: -SIN Line problems, telephones. -Toilet issues and clear year old write-ups during phase. -Deep clean the LCC during phase. -Line of funding for crew comfort items
Put money into infrastructure and WS*

Reduce crew member travel time, improve alert effectiveness, and expand training opportunities by realigning alert schedules to deploy two missile crews together to conduct 12-hour shifts covering a 72-hour alert period
Conduct manpower study to address 167 hours per month manpower standard vice the alert load of 265-312 hours per month performed
Ensure all tactical squadrons and OSS are manned to a minimum of 100%*
Publish, teach and support an academic integrity policy
Design curriculum and associated "dance card" for DMCCCs to complete prior to MCCC upgrade*
Review and redesign JPR training requirements to identify tasks best taught in LCC, MPT and classroom
Remove JPRs from classroom training for tasks performed regularly on alert or best taught in the MPT*
Reform ATEP to create relevant monthly training blocks but allow MWs discretion to schedule monthly blocks to meet local evaluation and inspection cycles*
Create a chief of training position responsible for designing and developing weapon system, codes and EWO training
Tailor remaining classroom training to fit specific MCCC and DMCCC requirements by training them in separate classes
Properly train instructors and evaluators through basic instructor course or improved ICE courses
Schedule a second MPT session each month tailored to crew's proficiency needs
Develop CBT tools to augment MPTs and enable MCCC-led training
Institute CRM training focused on reinforcing threat and error management strategies, beginning in IST
Define "currency" and "proficiency" in AFGSCI 13-5301 v1 and v5
Document MPT deficiencies by JPR, not by crew member

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

13N CFM should engage the Occupational Analysis Squadron to support development of CFETP
Include instruction on critical thinking skills; add to CFETP*
Include instruction on Resiliency; add to CFETP*
Create classroom training that goes beyond the minimum requirements (e.g., train to affective domain for more experienced MCCMs)*
Tailor training to those most vulnerable: new DMCCCs and new MCCCs*
Change requirement for codes training to semi-annual with refresher prior to code handling event; offer pre-test to more experienced MCCMs…if they pass they don't go to class*
Empower MCCCs to certify DMCCCs for alert activities
Rescind the 20 AF ATEP and adopt an approach to allow units to package JPRs together as needs dictate*
Minimize classroom instruction, especially for experienced MCCMs*
Create CBTs for knowledge-only information*
Performance criteria for CMR should be clearly outlined for development of appropriate CMR training products
Use MPT rides to expand skills and provide critical self-assessment of weaknesses; no one should fail a trainer ride
Create formal feedback loop to validate training and effectiveness of measurements
Limit knowledge testing of EWO concepts; most tasks can be demonstrated in the MPT
20 AF create and maintain MQF and ensure testing supports training and evaluation
Build quarterly exams from MQF focused on JPRs trained and emphasizing safety, security and ability to deliver weapon on-time, on-target
Conduct annual open book and MQF-based closed-book exams as part of annual crew member evaluations

De-emphasize 100% scores by making tests pass/fail or allowing crew testing
Only document training attendance
Remove crew force testing and associated metric to reduce quantifiable identifiers*
Shift the focus of operations proficiency to MPT and field; remove test scores from OPRs*
Restructure monthly individual tests to assess knowledge of "bold face" and time-critical topics; grade as pass/fail
Schedule, perform alerts as a team of five crews from a single flight to build teamwork and empower/develop flight CCs
Build teamwork and relationships among operations, maintenance, support, security forces, and medical personnel at lower levels by aligning field tour lengths and assigning missile crews as leaders of multifunction teams for the 72-hour alert period*
Change "Alert/Off Day" model to "Alert/Travel/Off Day"
Schedule EWO, codes and weapon system training on the same day
Remove integral crew alert rate requirement and metric
Lengthen alerts (2-3 days); deploy to the field as flights*
Do not allow supplements to DoD guidance
Assign flight surgeon to OG or extend return to duty hours at PRP medical clinic
Remove unnecessary paperwork from system
Make inspections pass/fail; place more value on spirit and intent and less value on paperwork*
Re-evaluate PRP billets*
Re-train commanders with legal and SARC
Make medical personnel available and PRP sick call times adequate (Malmstrom/FE Warren)*
Lengthen appointments with PRP personnel by 30 minutes to allow providers to complete the PRP paperwork and not force them to cut appointments short
Develop formal PRP training curriculum for providers and PRP administrators at AFGSC installations*

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Flight commanders should be required to observe their crew members at least once per quarter*
Revalidate the need for additional and duplicated duties
Establish 360 feedback to identify leadership qualities/deficiencies*
Empower crew commanders by providing additional leadership opportunities and making them responsible for developing the skills and knowledge of their crews
Squadron commanders will be ACP/SCP certified and pull alerts with CMR DMCCCs*
Clearly state desired/valued attributes of crew members, instructors, evaluators, staff members, and leaders*
Minimize classroom instruction, especially for experienced MCCMs*
Create a chief of training position responsible for designing and developing weapon system, codes and EWO training*
Properly train instructors and evaluators through basic instructor course or improved ICE courses*
Lengthen alerts (2-3 days); deploy to the field as flights*
Schedule, perform alerts as a team of five crews from a single flight to build teamwork and empower/develop flight CCs*
There needs to be more training/education on deterrence theory/assurance; give a sense of purpose; help build an intrinsic motivation
Provide Base of Preference (BOP) for individuals who depart the 13N career field through cross-flow processes
Clearly state desired/valued attributes of crew members, instructors, evaluators, staff members, and leaders*
13N CFM should engage the Occupational Analysis Squadron to support development of CFETP*
Design curriculum and associated "dance card" for DMCCCs to complete prior to MCCC upgrade*
Establish 360 feedback to identify leadership qualities/deficiencies

Enhance squadron and flight commanders' roles in directing squadron mission planning and operations
Passing is meeting the standard/spirit & intent in day-to-day ops*
Rescind the 20 AF ATEP and adopt an approach to allow units to package JPRs together as needs dictate*
HQ and DT will have to place the right people into value creating strategic billets at commissioning sources, such as Instructor duty in the Department of Management, and USAFA*
Clearly define roles and responsibilities of wing commanders, group commanders, squadron commanders, operations officers, assistant operations officers, flight commanders, and weapons officers
Create a Helicopter Wing/Group that reports to 8AF or AFGSC DRU (with OT&E OSS at each MW) that removes non-rated leadership from chain of command
Eliminate all 20AF responsibility for nuclear security & aviation*
Align TRF in Helicopter Wing/Group
Establish a current and relevant UH-1N AFGSC staff
Establish 360 feedback to identify leadership qualities/deficiencies*
Commanders must establish/communicate priorities at all levels, preferably in writing, to subordinates to fight the desire to micromanage
Remove OG-added spending approval process for flying
Allow HS to participate in AFI 11-401-allowed public relations events
MXG take ownership of AMXS issues
Ensure safety reports remain outside of command chain's ability to edit
Facilitate understanding of and ensure compliance with AFI 11-401 to prevent unauthorized flights*
Promote professional mentorship at squadron level
Fund AFGSC roadshow

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Remove Aerial Achievement Medal timeline restriction; release special mission aviators to joint/special duty
Require EPRs and AF Forms 1206 to emphasize job performance more than community service*
Create short-term cross-service exchanges
Immediately stop using UH-1N as a feeder MDS for CV-22 & HH-60
Breed CCs from UH-1N community
Slow aircrew upgrades until personnel are sufficiently experienced
Create a Weapons Instructor Course for UH-1N operations*
Eliminate inspection grades; focus on discrepancies for improvement
Combine requirements of multiple inspections into one inspection*
Create a single-source inspection agency
Stop treating SAVs as inspections
Create pertinent and current MICT checklists
Develop minor maintenance/ service syllabi and procedures for flight engineers; standardize with AETC
Allow for FAIPs to UH-1N
Make Form 8, 942 and 4348 non-inspectable beyond UH-1N qualification
Re-evaluate/write 5210.41M and associated AF guidance and address current postulated threat with capabilities
Time PCS cycle with promotion boards/school boards to make helicopter personnel competitive
Modify convoy procedures (e.g., allow contingent permission where convoy CC can go for permission before helicopters are in position and start moving convoy when in position; fly only one-ship convoys when able; set convoy dates)
Ensure participation of aircrews in guidance re-writes (TTP 3-3 and 3-1; AFI11-202)
AFGSC publish alert guidance and heliport or LZ guidance in lieu of airfield standards
Convert to electronic gradebooks; make 20 AF gradebooks align with 11-2UH-1N V1
NAF/MAJCOM use FCIF notification procedure

when new publications are released
Fund best practice studies and execute exercises
Report only requirements of CCIR/OPREP per AFI 10-206
Make short-notice and exceptionally early deadlines the exception
Acquire new aircraft or lessen backup alert force requirement
Update 2004 manpower study, to include alert and arming; suspend alert operations pending additional funded positions*
Update/build alert facilities that meet safety and health requirements
Develop 24/7 refueling options (e.g., bladders, tanks in missile complex)
Build maintenance and storage facilities and secure flight lines/helo movement areas
Assign PAI to Guernsey or BAI to units for loan to Guernsey
Change AFI 36-2903 to allow wear of government purchased items (e.g., MCPS)
Allow Sq/CCs to maximize EFB utilization, clear for DCNI and full implementation
Ensure HS/TRF alert facilities are given appropriate CE response priority*
Build appropriate facilities at WIC location
Update EFB AFI to provide connectivity at primary and alert locations for mission planning and scramble posture requirements; task comm sq appropriately
Update PFPS, CPUs; aircraft w/ FLIR, defensive systems, avionics, NVG compatibility; fund Bluetooth GPS receiver
Revalidate the need for additional and duplicated duties*
Reevaluate convoy aircraft and CMR requirements, actual need for RAP
Create plan for WIC and tactics test unit
Create written Guernsey TTPs
Conduct realistic exercises at home station with TRF, HS in-field forces and CRF
Provide formal aviation training and nuclear training opportunities
Enable inter-fly program
Align TRF in Helicopter Wing/Group*

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Facilitate understanding of and ensure compliance with AFI 11-401 to prevent unauthorized flights
Develop 24/7 refueling options (e.g., bladders, tanks in missile complex)*
Build maintenance and storage facilities and secure flight lines/helo movement areas*
CC must establish/communicate priorities at all levels*
Re-evaluate/write 5210.41M and associated AF guidance and address current postulated threat with capabilities*
Modify convoy procedures (e.g., allow contingent permission where convoy CC can go for permission before helicopters are in position and start moving convoy when in position; fly only one-ship convoys when able; set convoy dates)*
Develop minor maintenance/service syllabi and procedures for flight engineers; standardize with AETC*
Create a Helicopter Wing/Group that reports to 8AF or AFGSC DRU (with OT&E OSS at each MW) that removes non-rated leadership from chain of command*
Develop minor maintenance/service syllabi and procedures for flight engineers; standardize with AETC*
Allow Sq/CCs to maximize EFB utilization, clear for DCNI and full implementation*
Create a Helicopter Wing/Group that reports to 8AF or AFGSC DRU (with OT&E OSS at each MW) that removes non-rated leadership from chain of command*
CC must establish/communicate priorities at all levels*
Update 2004 manpower study, to include alert and arming; suspend alert operations pending additional funded positions*
Create a Helicopter Wing/Group that reports to 8AF or AFGSC DRU (with OT&E OSS at each MW) that removes non-rated leadership from chain of command*
Immediately stop using UH-1N as a feeder MDS for CV-22 & HH-60*
Update/build alert facilities that meet safety and health requirements*

Convert to electronic gradebooks; make 20 AF gradebooks align with 11-2UH-1N V1*
Attach MICT checklist with each new AFI*
Standardize 246 process, eliminate local guidance
A monthly conference call with 20th AF to discuss "bad" guidance with MXG representatives
List required references in the procedures where technicians are required to proceed to a different T.O. (eliminate as a memory item)
Respond to comments in Comment Resolution Matrices
Change the AF Form 847 process to mirror the AFTO Form 22 process with accompanying suspense requirements
When an ETAR is approved, the approving engineer needs to complete an AFTO Form 22 to change the T.O
Provide formal training class for ICBM personnel for IMDS, Data Integrity Team and scheduling
Allow team chiefs to train without having to be certified instructor-explore OJT for back shops
Allow 21M officers to career broaden
Combine 13N and 21MI into one career field
Bring 13N to missile maintenance for 2nd assignment*
Add 10 CSS billets per MW to perform administrative duties
Return 2M0/2W2 manning to 2007 levels at MWs
Use career Airmen BOP rules for first-term Airmen
Remove 2M0, 2W2 and 21M from force management vulnerability*
Level manning across the missile wings on the UMD and with actual people*
Add crew rest chart to AFI 21-202 to paragraph 2.1.2.3.1.5
Hold depot accountable for providing parts within a reasonable amount of time (90 days). Parts back-ordered longer than 90 days will be tracked
Fix Illustrated Parts Breakdowns (IPB)
Add 3 GS-07 supply positions at each MW

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Add 2S0XX supply Airmen at each MW
Increase funding for support equipment

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop replacement test equipment and test sets
Fully fund mandatory equipment purchase to meet mission requirements
Evaluate risk management processes; eliminate ineffective measures (e.g., rollover data)
Identify and eliminate restrictive, low-value requirements. from AFIs 21-200, 21-202v1 and 21-204 (e.g. requirement for Special Certification Roster in AFI 21-200)
Eliminate duplication of alert status and daily maintenance schedules from IMDS onto NMC2 and FSR
Eliminate MMOC post-maintenance backout checklist
Flow guidance from COCOM and MAJCOM through NAF
Make surveys truly voluntary or put less emphasis on the number of people that take it
Do not make all "disagree" answers on a survey to require a written report
Provide survey results in a timely manner
Consider tailoring SAPR days, resiliency days, DUI days to base specific incidents versus force-wide
Reinstate Guardian Sword
Authorize unit ball caps*
Reinstate Master Technician, Team Chief, Instructor and Evaluator badges*
Send deserving 2W2/2M0X3 personnel to observe FOT&E launches
Start 5-level training within 6 months of CDC completion
Implement approved Nuclear Duty Medal
Keep fitness centers open 24/7
Provide adequate amounts of office and cleaning supplies
Re-open DFAC and open Shopette 24/7 at FE Warren
Issue adequate cold weather gear
Invest in infrastructure (e.g., dorms, recreation) at missile bases
Define 20 AF roles and responsibilities*

Implement nuclear duty incentive pay*
Develop job-related professional development program
Identify and eliminate restrictive, low-value requirements. from AFIs 21-200, 21-202v1 and 21-204 (e.g. requirement for Special Certification Roster in AFI 21-200)
Implement an electronic parts research system that mirrors the operability of the Tinker Integrated Data for Maintenance part number database; Fix Illustrated Parts Breakdowns (IPB)
Empower subordinates, stop micromanaging; trust motives
Change the report-no-later-than-dates for 2R1X1 personnel PCS to ICBM bases to ensure proper overlap with outbound personnel is achieved and adequate training is provided
Reinstate Guardian Challenge/Guardian Sword at VAFB*
Increase funding and personnel levels at AFGSC
Make AFGSC/CC a 4-star billet
Send top personnel with nuclear experience to AFGSC staff
Combine support inspections with NSIs and NORIs*
Give support personnel hands-on education of nuclear mission
Overhaul FTOC/LPDP to immerse CGOs in career fields
Man AFGSC at 100% for military and civilian billets*
Grant overtime approval to squadron CCs; provide funds to squadron to manage
Authorize MSG/CC and MDG/CC to waive requirements for duties associated with unfilled positions
Increase compensation to compete with the local economy
Implement nuclear duty incentive pay*
Alter tour lengths based on the overseas model (e.g., 3 years for most MSG/MGD personnel, 2 years for medical providers, BOP for enlisted)
Provide more USO-type morale events,

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

especially at Minot and Malmstrom

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Provide Space A "rotator" travel option to Minot and Malmstrom
Avoid providing incentives to only select personnel/career fields*
Fund TDYs for medical providers to complete their CEUs while stationed at remote nuclear installations
Task MDG to support ICBM field deployers at their dispatch location*
Avoid "dog and pony" shows; stop whitewashing inadequate equipment and facilities during tours
Encourage senior leaders to arrive unannounced*
Align DV schedules to combine visits*
Insist on visiting the non "sexy" shops*
Tailor speeches to smaller, target audiences in lieu of all-calls
Provide formal follow-up on promises made and issues raised in forums
Do not use personnel on off days to serve as rent-a-crowd*
MAJCOM or higher provide explicit direction on program reductions to offset cuts
Provide full funding to units at the start of FY
Ensure the future unit budgets will not be cut if money is returned
Execute significant facility recapitalization at Minot*
BRAC AF installations and fence gains in funds and personnel for nuclear mission
Restore TDY funding and lower the approval level to squadrons
Fund updates/creation of computer systems
Fund preventive maintenance to prevent future expenses, specifically for facilities. CE currently can only fund emergency work orders
Stop cutting vehicle maintenance budgets at missile installations. Higher number of vehicles, higher mileage vehicles, and specialized vehicles dictate that the mx budgets must not be cut more
Adopt narrative format for performance reports; no narrative for SrA and below*

Limit content of performance reports to job performance only—no volunteer service, off-duty education, etc
Eliminate the number scale on EPRs; change to "Ready" and "Not Ready" for Promotion
Allow supervisors to write using plain English (additional rater does not alter rater's words but uses his/her block)
Capture awards on SURF
Eliminate the requirement from AFIs for Wing/Group/Sq supplements- allow units to supplement only if they choose to do so*
Add Missile Chef introductory block to Services Apprentice technical school (not in depth training, just overview/introduction)
Update existing NWRM training plan for LRS personnel
Review requirements for CBTs and Total Force Awareness Training CBTs (i.e., Fire Extinguisher- delete requirement, Trafficking in Persons- 1 time, pre-deployment CBTs- Only prior to deployment, Cyber awareness- 3 yr requirement, etc)
Extend timeline for EOD personnel to become fully qualified on all weapons systems from 180 days to 270 or 365 days
Overhaul Staff Assistance visit process to ensure they provide a formal written report, provide recommended solutions to problems identified and share lessons learned/best practices across units in AFGSC
Increase funding and personnel levels at AFGSC
Limit reviews to only the rating chain
Develop formal PRP training curriculum for providers and PRP administrators at AFGSC installations
Eliminate the requirement from AFIs for Wing/Group/Sq supplements- allow units to supplement only if they choose to do so*
Adopt narrative format for performance reports; no narrative for SrA and below
Ensure decisions are made at appropriate leadership levels
Implement Individual discipline vs wide sweeping knee-jerk reactions

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Establish 360 degree communication and reinforce existing lines of communication*
Adapt AFGSC Commanders Course with block of instruction outlining the development of junior leaders/NCOs
Create mandatory nuclear security course to establish a baseline leadership understanding of the ICBM mission
Change evaluation and inspection grades to "pass/fail" to reduce the amount of preparation activity and leadership desire to score Excellent/Outstanding*
Treat subordinate-level leadership mistakes as learning opportunities rather than opportunities to administer discipline or punitive action
Eliminate unnecessary taskers to enable leadership more time to visit the field
Transition leadership engagements in the field from "post compliance checks" to morale visits
Allow squadron commanders to determine dual-arming requirements
Stop micromanaging, e.g., requiring Break Safety Reports
Remove names from award submissions to remove perception of favoritism
Cease requirement for SF members to call flight leadership for "gear check" before responding to security situations
Recommend alert pay to compensate SF members who deploy to the field because, on average, they deploy more than deployed airmen do overseas*
To recognize missile field deployments, provide an appropriate decoration or medal*
Establish a 3 or 4 year controlled tour, with a follow-on base selection opportunity to a non-missile base
Consider adjusting manpower requirements to meet the most likely threat scenario rather than the worst case threat scenario*
Enable commanders to adjust manning requirements based on day-to-day real world threats and vulnerabilities

Adjust manpower requirements by taking credit for security upgrades such as concrete headworks, fast rising B-plug, remote visual assessment, and 24 hour alert TRF
Revalidate PRP positions and remove positions from PRP that are not afforded direct access to nuclear weapons
If SF members must be placed on PRP, then recommend all SFG members be placed on PRP to create flexibility in meeting manning requirements*
Align PRP requirements with "authority to bear arms" requirement and manage SF reliability through supervisor's responsibility to arm SF members, and cease PRP for SF*
Rescind policy to move PRP suspended/decertified personnel from their owning flight to the janitorial flight if cause is non-punitive
Rescind policy to "pre-suspend" members on PRP when attending medical appointments
Cease use of "orange sheets"
Rescind ability to supplement DOD PRP guidance
Cease practice of recalling SF members for non-mission essential requirements
Cease practice of training items required by AF Security Forces Center that are not needed for ICBM duty
Create a focused nuclear defense course to ensure SF members arriving to the ICBM field have the required training to perform nuclear security duty
Consider a shred-out to the SF AFSC highlighting nuclear unique requirements
Combine Shoot Move Communicate, Force on Force, and Sustainment firing (Malmstrom) to meet AFI 36-2646 requirements
Evaluate validity DOD 5210.41M vehicle requirement versus threat. Reapportion OCO returning UA SUVs/pickup trucks
Field test new vehicles in the missile field operating environment prior to acquiring/using them

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
ICBM FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (FIP) RECOMMENDATIONS

Install additional electric heaters in HMMWVs
Purchase 203 vests that do not place ammo on wearer's back
Coordinate with units on purchasing more pintle mounts and cradles for heavy weapons. Due to attrition, ensure all units are equipped to 120%
Upgrade and provide additional computers and connectivity at MAFs
Install Wi-Fi at MAFs
Allow long-distance calling at MAFs that do not have cell phone coverage
Purchase 5-ton HMMWV jacks to enable user maintenance such as tire changes
Add additional dummy signs in the missile field to enable navigation
Stop requiring helmet wear in HMMWVs and only require gear wear when responding to a security situation
Only require gas mask wear when actual threat exists
Allow MAF kitchen use to non-chefs
Allow commanders to determine the best practices to standardize and allow tactical items to remain unstandardized across the groups
Define, enforce, and ensure responsibilities of each level of leadership are communicated to all levels*
Cease practice of training items required by AF Security Forces Center that are not needed for ICBM duty*
Re-evaluate/write 5210.41M and associated AF guidance and address current postulated threat with capabilities*
Identify and eliminate restrictive, low-value requirements. From AFIs 21-200, 21-202v1 and 21-204 (e.g. requirement for Special Certification Roster in AFI 21-200)*
Evaluate validity DOD 5210.41M vehicle requirement versus threat. Reapportion OCO returning UA SUVs/pickup trucks*
Ensure decisions are made at appropriate leadership levels*

(* denotes duplicate input/idea)

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

JUNE 25, 2015

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Admiral BENEDICT.

- E7, attached to Naval Ordnances Testing Unit in Port Canaveral, FL stands accused of sexually assaulting another E7's spouse. This case is being prosecuted by civilian courts.
- E5, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, stands accused of eight counts of child molestation and is in custody of civilian authorities. The command is processing the accused for an administrative separation from the Navy.
- E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, is accused of violating Article 107 (false official statement) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and three specifications of Article 112a (two wrongful uses of a controlled substance and, an introduction of a controlled substance onto an installation used by the armed forces). Charges were referred to a Special Court-Martial on 2 June 2015 and arraignment is docketed for 17 August 2015 with a proposed trial date of 30 September 2015.
- E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, was accused of violating Article 90 (assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment.
- E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, was accused of violating Article 91 (insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment.
- E4, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, was accused of violating Article 92 (failure to obey order or regulation) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment.
- E4, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, was accused of violating Article 92 (failure to obey order or regulation) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment. [See page 20.]

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate your desire to review the list of recommendations from our Airmen gathered during Air Force Global Strike Command's Force Improvement Program. The attached document reflects raw inputs from the field; as such, several are redundant as indicated by an asterisk. This list has more the 400 entries; the number of unique recommendations is approximately 350 as we discussed during my testimony. [See page 20.]

[The document referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

General WEINSTEIN. The following table shows the number of courts-martial of Twentieth Air Force Airmen that went to a verdict in each of the full calendar years following the activation of Air Force Global Strike Command on August 7, 2009. Also included is the rate of courts-martial per 1,000 Airmen compared with the Air Force rate per thousand (RPT).

Year	20 AF Courts-Martial	20 AF RPT	Air Force RPT
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As of 21 July 2015, 9 courts-martial went to a verdict in Twentieth Air Force with a 1.2 RPT year-to-date. The Air Force RPT is 1.8 year-to-date. Since 25 June 2014, recent courts-martial include the cases of 3 officers and 10 enlisted that went to a verdict. As of 21 July 2015, court-martial proceedings are on-going in the case of 1 officer and 4 enlisted. [See page 20.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JUNE 25, 2015

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

Mrs. HARTZLER. Describe your access to senior leaders within the services and OSD to monitor implementation of the NER recommendations.

Dr. BRUMER. My level of access to senior leadership has been excellent; all Services and DOD Components understand the high priority of the nuclear mission and are quick to respond to requests for information and briefings. I also have access to Deputy Secretary of Defense Work on a regular basis and am frequently contacted to provide updates on the progress of recommendation implementation. I greatly appreciate the cooperation we have received from the Services and we work hard to be judicious in our data requests to ensure good use of everyone's time.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Describe the sufficiency of access and information you receive from the services to monitor the progress of the recommendations.

Dr. BRUMER. The Services and DOD Components have provided and continue to provide a wealth of information to support metrics and analysis behind each of the recommendations. This data enables us to assess proposed approaches for implementation and to understand the impact of the recommendations on the core issues by comparing the baseline conditions to changes in metrics over time.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What processes have been set in place to track the implementation of the recommendations?

Dr. BRUMER. Last February, the Secretary of Defense directed OSD CAPE to track and assess the implementation of the Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendations and established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to hold senior leadership accountable. Deputy Secretary of Defense Work continues to chair regular meetings of the NDERG at which CAPE provides updates and metrics on progress made toward implementing the recommendations and addressing the underlying issues. This is supported by a three-star level Senior Oversight Group to vet issues and resolve conflicts. Additionally, my team holds bi-weekly working group level meetings attended by representatives from the Services, USSTRATCOM, Joint Staff, and OSD to update actions on each recommendation and evaluate progress through milestones and metrics.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What are the metrics being used to track progress on recommendations, and how do they measure the health of the the nuclear enterprise?

Dr. BRUMER. My team is tracking hundreds of unique metrics, including both process and outcome metrics. Process metrics help to determine whether a particular task is completed, whereas outcome metrics assess whether the cumulative effects of the tasks are achieving the desired intent of the recommendations and improving the overall health of the Enterprise. The goal of the outcome metrics is to go beyond box checking and assess the progress made to address the underlying issues. For those aspects of enterprise health that cannot be easily measured, such as morale, we are utilizing other tools like climate surveys and site visits to understand the intangibles, test hypotheses, and hear from the forces in the field on what they're seeing.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What are the Department's end state goal and objectives for regaining healthiness within the nuclear enterprise and when does the Department estimate that those goals and objectives will be achieved?

Dr. BRUMER. The reviews stated the nuclear enterprise has been sustained through shortfalls in manning, equipment, documentation, and guidance through the extraordinary effort and sacrifice on the part of our Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. The end state goal and objective for the Department is to regain the margin that has been eroded to ensure that this unsustainable level of effort and sacrifice is no longer necessary. The nuclear enterprise cannot be fixed overnight; these issues have been decades in the making and will require years of sustained attention to be resolved. While we do hope to see significant improvement in climate and similar metrics in the near future, the materiel recapitalization of the nuclear triad will not be complete until the mid-2030s.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What steps are being taken to institutionalize the desired oversight mechanisms within the Department to ensure the future safety, security, reliability, and vitality remains sufficient within the nuclear enterprise?

Dr. BRUMER. In addition to the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Services have taken steps to ensure greater oversight of the nuclear mission within their organizations. The Air Force has elevated Global Strike Command to a four-star billet and has elevated the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration to a three-star billet, pending Congressional approval. The Navy has codified the role of the three-star Director, Strategic Systems Programs as the regulatory lead for the Navy's Nuclear Deterrence Mission, responsible for providing guidance to its nuclear force and monitoring and assessing the mission.

Mrs. HARTZLER. In regards to the personnel reliability program (PRP), one of the recommendations stated that the "commanders and supervisors, not the PRP monitor and medical community," should be responsible for fitness-for-duty determinations. However, wouldn't the medical community best able to determine fitness for duty, especially in connection with health and/or mental health issues? And how will the Department ensure consistent standards?

Dr. BRUMER. CAPE's role in the Nuclear Enterprise Review has been to track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of the recommendations, conduct analysis to determine if actions are having the desired effect, and assess the health of the Nuclear Enterprise. The Services would best be able to address their specific approaches to determining fitness-for-duty, within the prescribed regulations. Fitness for duty is a whole-person concept, not just a physical health matter or a bureaucratic compliance function. However, we will continue to monitor the medical community's involvement in the PRP process and remain vigilant to the risk that changes to PRP processes may have unintended consequences.

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard?

Admiral BENEDICT. Department leaders are committed to improving the morale of the force by changing the culture of micromanagement, enhancing training, and closing the gap between what leaders say and what they do. Former Secretary Hagel wanted to ensure that pride and professionalism in these areas are reinforced. The actions we are taking will involve changes in the organization, policies and culture. Other fixes will require an increase in resources allocated to the nuclear mission. The reviews had high praise for the dedication and professionalism of the nuclear workforce. The main concern regarding our service members is their morale and quality of life, not their proficiency. Navy Leadership will continue to monitor established morale and assessment tools coupled with increased site visits to monitor this area.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the "inspection is the mission" mindset?

Admiral BENEDICT. Navy launched a "Reduce Administrative Distractions (RAD)" program to streamline or eliminate administrative processes, instructions and training that add little return on investment. RAD is about putting "Warfighting First;" eliminating distractions that inhibit effectiveness and efficiency in our fleet. It is not a "one time push" but a level of effort—a new normal where everyone is sensitive to eliminating distractions to reduce frustrations and strengthen effectiveness and efficiency. The first topics that the RAD initiative focused on were the ones that Sailors stated were the highest priority. It's going on now—involvement is encouraged from the top down. The highest levels of Navy leadership are driving this through strategic communication.

Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense updated the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) regulations to remove administrative burden, prevent inspectors from questioning medical judgments, revise rules regarding who must be on PRP and make PRP truly a commander's program to ensure reliability without imposing bureaucratic red tape that harms the mission. We will make an announcement on the updated program shortly. The Joint Staff has also updated the inspection guidance to reduce the periodicity and consolidate redundant inspections.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year's budget, and the future year's defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER's recommendations? Are there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives?

Admiral BENEDICT. In addition to addressing delays in long-term SSBN maintenance, PB16 restores and maintains acceptable margin within the force by:

- Adding over 100 people (mix of civilian and military) to improve sustainment and training of the ballistic missile submarine force.
- Increasing funding to strategic weapons facility infrastructure sustainment and recapitalization to ensure long term health of these critical facilities.

- Increasing funding to fund R&D and operational engineering support to shore up the industrial base and accelerate efforts for a Trident follow-on to the already life-extended Trident II D5 missile.
- Increasing the authority of the Director, Strategic Systems and Programs (SSP) who will become the Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission (NNDM) Regulator, the central lead for oversight, in order to sharpen our operational focus. SSP will report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on nuclear force readiness.
- Executing a "Reduce Administrative Distractions" program to streamline or eliminate administrative processes, instructions and training that add little return on investment.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection?

Admiral BENEDICT. The Navy will work with OSD and Congress to implement recommendations across the fleet to ensure safety and reliability. Navy added $464 million in PB16 ($2.18 billion FYDP) to restore and maintain acceptable margin within the force. Navy is working with OSD to respond to the broad spectrum of recommendations while ensuring the Navy's response addresses Navy specific issues.

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard?

General WEINSTEIN. Culture change within an institution takes time. This issue has my daily, personal attention and is a priority with my senior staff. As such, we continue to assess the morale of our Airmen and adjust as necessary. I, as well as my command chief master sergeant, visit remote work centers across our 33,600 square mile area of responsibility, conduct online chats with Airmen and review judicial data with my staff judge advocate; these are but a few forums that help me and my leadership team better understand our culture. We continue to place emphasis on continuous improvement and feedback.

Fortunately, our Airmen in 20 AF are willing to give critical feedback, even to me, through direct interaction, through surveys such as the Air Force Combined Mishap Reduction System and using feedback tools in Air Force Global Strike Command's Force Improvement Program. I'm pleased to report our fielded force appreciates the changes we're making; these talented, dedicated Airmen are the foundation upon which we'll continue to make improvements.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the "inspection is the mission" mindset?

General WEINSTEIN. Twentieth Air Force, along with Air Force Global Strike Command, has implemented the new Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) as outlined in Air Force Instruction 90–201, The Air Force Inspection System. This program operates under the philosophy that inspections are an inherent function of command, where inspection preparation is directly aligned with mission readiness. Wing personnel conduct the majority of AFIS activities to evaluate issues of interest to the local wing commander. Meanwhile, the Inspector General team at Air Force Global Strike Command provides oversight and continuous mentoring as the process matures.

The Air Force will continue to administer Nuclear Surety Inspections at regular intervals in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year's budget, and the future year's defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER's recommendations? Are there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives?

General WEINSTEIN. The President's FY16 budget and FYDP submission supports our ability to implement NER recommendations.

As of 3 August 2015, not all of the defense committees fully funded the President's Budget Request of $506M for the UH–1N replacement. The current helicopters employed in the missile field do not meet DOD requirements for speed, range, and payload lifting capacity to move security forces to the missile field in response to a contingency. No amount of further modifications to the UH–1N can completely bridge these capability shortfalls. From an operational perspective, any delay in the new helicopter could endanger the security of the weapon system.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection?

General WEINSTEIN. Prior to the Nuclear Enterprise Review, Air Force Global Strike Command conducted three studies to look at issues within the command. These reviews—the Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), Study of Operations Training and Evaluation (SOTE) and the AFGSC Force Improvement Program

(FIP)—generated approximately 350 recommendations from our front-line Airmen. After consideration of each recommendation, we began implementation or further study on the vast majority, to include restructuring the operational missile squadrons, defining a career path for missile officers and increasing professional development opportunities for all Airmen.

Upon release of the NER, we identified over 90 percent congruence between the NER and these three AFGSC studies. As the commander of the operational ICBM force, I'm confident these varied teams of experts pinpointed our shortfalls and formed the basis for our continuous improvement efforts.

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard?

General CLARK. The bomber Force Improvement Program (FIP) has become a philosophy of continuous improvement within Eighth Air Force and Air Force Global Strike Command. We are continuously assessing the state of our organization and health of our personnel. Even though we are continuously assessing, the dynamic and nebulous nature of warfare makes it impossible for us to establish a goal that, once reached, will allow us to relax and stop our forward progress. We are constantly seeking to improve, constantly setting the bar higher, never being satisfied with the status-quo. If we stop improving we are in danger of back-sliding. Therefore, we will carry on our FIP and continue soliciting feedback from our Airmen to continue improving the culture and morale of Eighth Air Force.

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the "inspection is the mission" mindset?

General CLARK. Both Eighth Air Force and Air Force Global Strike Command are working hard to reduce the number of inspections and lessen the burden on the Airmen. Currently many IG changes are being implemented helping to streamline processes. Primarily, we are lining up inspections with the AF Inspection System (AFIS), putting the responsibility on the wings to self-report and we follow up. The AFIS provides a mechanism for senior Air Force leaders to direct a targeted, more detailed and thorough inspection of specific programs, organizations, or issues (AFI 90–201, para 1.4.3).

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year's budget, and the future year's defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER's recommendations? Are there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives?

General CLARK. This question is difficult to answer from a NAF standpoint. For this question, an excerpt for the 3.5.14 SASC SF—Nuclear Forces Hearing must be referenced. "And we need, therefore, we have to have a funding hump in the next decade to make sure that we get our funding up to the right amount, and that could take around $35 billion a year, which at $35 billion a year will represent about five percent of our defense budget. So it's not impossible for us to reach that, and if we could get to the point where we've modernized and in the right way, we'll be on the right path. Now, of the new spending, only two percent of—of this amount is for the weapons modernization itself. That's relatively inexpensive. And it's a small price to pay for the nation's ultimate insurance policy, and for an arsenal that has maintained great power and peace, really, for 70 years."

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection?

General CLARK. Eighth Air Force has no issues with the reports; however the recommendations were not implemented verbatim. Some of the recommendations were tailored to AFGSC and 8AF, but staying in the spirit and intent of the recommendation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. As a follow-up to my question during the hearing, please provide our committee with information regarding recent or on-going court-martial cases. How does the number of court-martials in the 20th Air Force compare with the rest of the Air Force? Is it higher or lower than the average for the Air Force?

General WEINSTEIN. The following table shows the number of courts-martial of Twentieth Air Force Airmen that went to a verdict in each of the full calendar years following the activation of Air Force Global Strike Command on August 7, 2009. Also included is the rate of courts-martial per 1,000 Airmen compared with the Air Force rate per thousand (RPT).

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Ms. SPEIER. Please provide the committee with the studies that led to keeping a 24-hour shift in missile silos. Please also provide the committee with any studies or reviews of whether there is a problem of sleep-deprivation. Have there been any independent reviews on the question of whether there is a problem of sleep-deprivation?

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify our discussion on work shifts for our alert force. Two-officer crews serve 24-hour shifts in each of the 45 Launch Control Centers; it is highly unlikely either officer would experience sleep-deprivation. Thanks to built-in safeguards in the Minuteman weapon system, and the deliberate scheduling of required tasks while on alert, one of the two officers may sleep in a sound-proof bed area within the LCC while the other monitors the weapon system. In short, we allow rest periods and only under rare circumstances do officers on crew not have the opportunity to rest.

Ms. SPEIER. Please provide the committee with a copy of the RAND report "Identifying Key Workplaces Stressors Affecting the Twentieth Air Force." Have the morale issues identified in this report been addressed in the NER recommendations or other on-going corrective actions?

General WEINSTEIN. We've provided an electronic copy per your request.

RAND highlighted several morale issues in this report, specifically among our missile field chefs. One of the first decisions I made after assuming command of Twentieth Air Force was to move these chefs from our operations groups to our mission support groups (our experts in food service), giving these groups a vested interest in assuring ICBM combat capability across our 33,600 square mile AOR. With this move we addressed a prime concern among our Airmen.

In these groups, missile chefs now work with and for Airmen from the Services career field; this enables them to receive mentoring from experienced Services leaders and exposes them to other Services specialties, thus preparing them for promotion and advancement in their career field.

Regarding other morale issues highlighted by RAND, we've addressed these through Air Force Global Strike Command's Force Improvement Program (FIP) which pre-dated the NER by several months, but reflects the NER's recommendations to change the culture of micromanagement and boost morale through incentives and career opportunities.

[The RAND report referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request or accessed online at http://cradmin.clerk.house.gov/repository/AS/AS06/20150625/103680/HHRG-114-AS06-Wstate-WeinsteinUSAFJ-20150625-SD001.pdf.]

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